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Abstract
ADAM NEAL VAN LIERE: Nongovernmental Organizations and the World Trade 
Organization
(Under the direction of Thomas Oatley)
 Since 1995 over 1,700 different NGOs have found ways to engage the WTO.  
They have submitted unsolicited amicus briefs and attended ministerial conferences en 
masse, disrupting the organization and aggravating its membership.  They have also 
submitted over 460 position papers and participated in numerous WTO-sponsored 
symposia.  In spite of these observations, very little is actually known about this overall 
group of NGOs: what causes do they represent and why do they do what they do?  The 
state-centered emphasis of traditional international relations theory struggles to answer 
these questions.  As an alternative, this dissertation seeks answers by profiling these 
NGOs and utilizing social movement theory in a multi-level framework to explore their 
motivations.  Are these NGOs responding to the political opportunities at the WTO to 
defend critical interests, or are they merely using the WTO to help attract additional 
resources to their cause?
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Introduction
 Since 1995 over 1,700 different nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have 
found ways to engage the World Trade Organization (WTO).  These groups have attended 
the ad hoc symposia held by the WTO and submitted over 490 position papers. NGOs 
have also attended each of six ministerial conferences.  At the first  such conference in 
Singapore, in 1996, 108 NGOs attended.  By the third ministerial conference in Seattle, in 
1999, that number increased almost sevenfold, to 739 NGOs.  The ministerial conference 
held in Hong Kong, in 2005, was attended by 812 NGOs.  These groups have also 
become active in the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO by  submitting 
unsolicited amicus briefs.
 In spite of these observations, very  little is actually known about this overall 
group of NGOs: who exactly are they and why do they do what they do?  Such questions 
are important because they get  directly  to the heart our understanding about how actors 
behave in a globalized world.  The traditional expectation in international relations theory 
is that NGOs will work through the state to affect international politics because the WTO 
is an intergovernmental organization.  This is a belief that is reflected in opinions 
expressed at WTO General Council meetings, with the membership arguing that NGOs 
should not play a direct role in the work of the organization.  Instead, the members 
themselves are encouraged to work with NGOs through domestic political processes.
 NGOs, however, have continued with, and in many ways increased, their direct 
contact with the WTO since 1995.  Consequently, it would appear that these groups value 
this type of involvement, but why?  The overall pattern of observed NGO participation 
calls into question the efficacy of explanations based solely on the international level or 
on the domestic level to explain trade policy outcomes.  International-level explanations 
typically focus on negotiations between state actors to explain the pattern of outcomes in 
the trade regime while domestic-level explanations focus on the domestic factors that 
lead a state to pursue certain trade policies.  Even where these two approaches are 
combined in a two-level game, the state acts as a funnel through which all other actions 
must pass.
 The observation that NGOs become directly  involved with the WTO seemingly 
falls outside this traditional dichotomy within international relations theory.  Instead, to 
answer the why question it may  be necessary to rethink the framework that  links together 
different groups of actors within international politics.  Rather than conceptualizing a 
system whereby states necessarily act as gatekeepers between domestic and international 
politics, it may be important to consider what happens when the rules of the system 
change and evolve in such a way that NGOs and international organizations like the 
WTO will interact with one another.
Defining Terms
 As with any attempt to examine some facet of global governance and regulation, it 
is necessary to define the key terms that are used throughout this dissertation.  Since the 
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focus of this dissertation is on the WTO, the larger debate regarding what constitutes 
“globalization” can be sidestepped.  However, it  is important to offer simple definitions 
for the three groups of actors whose interactions form the basis for analysis that follows: 
the states, the NGOs, and the WTO itself.
 In international relations theory, states are commonly defined as sovereign 
territories where the ruler or government has final authority within the boundaries of that 
state.  For the purposes of this dissertation, the terms state and country  will refer to the 
government of a state or customs territory  that has full autonomy in conducting its trade 
policies.  By including customs territories in this manner, it becomes possible to refer to 
all members of the WTO with a single term.  Examples of customs territories that  are 
members of the WTO include Chinese Taipei and Hong Kong.  In each case, the customs 
territory maintains sovereign control over trade policy  within its boundaries but the 
territory itself would not be recognized as a proper state.
 The term NGO traditionally refers to value-based organizations that are 
independent of governments.  In slight  contrast to these definitions, the use of the terms 
NGO and non-state actor in this dissertation will refer to any  private actor affected by or 
interested in outcomes at the WTO. Consequently, the types of groups considered include 
the value-based organizations such as development and assistance-related groups like 
Oxfam or environment-related groups like the World Wide Fund for Nature.  But the 
usage here also incorporates economic-based organizations such as business associations. 
Additionally, this definition includes groups whose purposes are both value- and 
economic-based such as the World Confederation of Labour. 
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 The WTO is an international organization that provides a forum for trade 
negotiations, a set of rules for managing international trade, and a place for settling 
disputes between member states.  With regards to traditional international relations 
theory, this is where the definition of an international organization would stop.  However, 
it is important to recognize that the WTO is more than just a table at which member states 
gather for these reasons.  The WTO deals in issues that create both the winners and 
losers.  As such, the organization plays a direct role in shaping the behavior of states and 
NGOs affected by the agreements and dispute settlements.
Dissertation Outline
 This dissertation is divided into two principal sections.  The first section, chapter 
two, examines conventional explanations for the role of NGOs and the WTO in 
international politics, such as those framed within the international-level and the 
domestic-level literature.  This chapter then develops an alternative framework for 
conceptualizing how different  groups of actors like states, NGOs, and the WTO might 
interact with one another within international politics. The second chapter further 
develops two basic hypotheses to help determine the plausibility of this new conceptual 
framework by evaluating why NGOs are engaging the WTO.  The first hypothesis takes a 
top-down approach positing that NGOs engage the WTO because they are aware of the 
structure of the system and concerned with the affects it will have on the issues they  care 
about.  The second, competing hypothesis involves bottom-up considerations whereby 
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NGOs may  be seen as engaging the WTO but their real concern is with the mobilizing 
resources and networking with other NGOs.
 The second section, chapters three and four, takes a closer look at  the NGOs that 
have engaged the WTO to assess the two hypotheses developed in chapter two.  Chapter 
three examines the overall population of groups that have attended the six WTO 
ministerial conferences.  The development of this population description is important 
because it has never been done before but it seems a necessary prerequisite for fully 
explaining why NGOs engage the WTO is understanding who exactly those NGOs are. 
Using information from the WTO and other sources this chapter describes the overall 
population and their countries of origin and takes a more detailed look at the types and 
issues represented by some of these NGOs.  This chapter also includes the results of Tobit 
regression analysis that examines the effect that an NGOs relationships with other 
international organizations or nongovernmental organizations has on the frequency  of 
attendance at WTO ministerial conferences for which it is available. 
 Chapter four explores the relationship between NGOs, the WTO, and the 
environment more generally  but also looks at the specific dispute settlement case 
involving United States’ regulations on the importation of shrimp that did not adequately 
protect endangered sea turtles.  As the international trade system has evolved, the 
environment is an area that has become increasingly important for managing the how 
states trade with one another that has the potential to significantly  affect the outcomes 
that are desired by a broader set  of NGOs.  The shrimp-turtle dispute initiated by India, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand against the United States in early 1997 is important 
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because it  represents the first time NGOs were allowed to submit  unsolicited amicus 
briefs, and that was only after the Appellate Body  reversed the initial panel decision on 
the matter.
 Before proceeding it  is useful to clarify what this dissertation is and is not about. 
First, it is important to keep  in mind that the term NGO is used here to refer to same set 
of groups that the WTO refers to as NGOs, all organizations that are not governments and 
do not hold observer status to the various WTO bodies.  As a consequence, the list of 
NGOs examined includes groups like the Center for International Environmental Law 
and Greenpeace International as well as groups like the American Fiber, Textiles and 
Apparel Coalition and the Minerals Council of Australia.  Although the reasons why such 
organizations exist might vary from values to economics, they are all organizations that 
have stepped outside the traditional two-level game to participate directly with the WTO.
 It is equally  important to note the scope of this dissertation rests with trying to 
understand why NGOs would step outside the traditional two-level game to directly 
engage with the WTO.  At this time the goal is not necessarily to determine whether these 
groups were successful in achieving their desired outcomes.  Similarly, the goal here is 
not to evaluate whether globalization or NGO contact with the WTO has somehow 
weakened the role of the state.  Finally, this dissertation is only  focused on direct NGO 
contact with the WTO and not direct NGO contact with all intergovernmental 
organizations.  Although these various claims may represent avenues for further study, 
this dissertation is most intrigued with the question of why NGOs would ultimately 
bypass the state in order to directly engage the WTO.
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 The methods employed in the second section of this dissertation are largely 
inductive in nature because very  little is known about the overall pattern of engagement 
by NGOs with regards to the WTO.  The general observation of NGO involvement with 
the WTO suggests that both of these hypotheses may be reasonable characterizations. 
However, it  is still necessary to gather information to thoroughly examine how actors 
have behaved.  When done correctly, case studies can provide evidence for or against the 
plausibility of these core characterizations and, moreover, case studies are particularly 
useful during the initial stages of theory construction (Eckstein 1975; George and 
McKeown 1985).
 Empirically, case studies are appropriate because they  are exceptionally adept at 
untangling complex relationships (Eckstein 1975; George and McKeown 1985; Van 
Evera 1997).  Although the two hypotheses presented here could be seen as competitors, 
it is wholly conceivable that  the actual reason NGOs engage the WTO is a combination 
of both top-down and bottom-up considerations.  Or, it is possible that some groups are 
responding to top-down concerns about the structure of the international trade regime 
while other groups are responding to the bottom-up pressures of needing to mobilize 
resources.  The complexities involved with understanding all of these considerations lend 
themselves to more case-study-like analysis that can be more adept at determining why 
NGOs are participating directly with the WTO.
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The Changing & Evolving Trade System
 Several key changes to the structure of the international trade system have taken 
place since the end of World War II.  These events provide the backdrop  against which 
the theoretical argument presented here rests.  It is, after all, the combination of the 
observed interactions between NGOs and the WTO along with the knowledge of how the 
system has changed that led to the initial questioning of the efficacy of conventional 
international relations theory for explanations regarding the contemporary relationship 
between states, NGOs, and the WTO.
 The GATT agreement signed by twenty-three states in October 1947 sought to 
establish a multilateral framework for the rules used to govern border measures that 
affected international trade.  Among the guiding principles enshrined in the GATT was 
the importance of “most-favored-nation treatment” and of “national treatment.”  Under 
the former, member state were expected to treat  all other members of the agreement 
equally and under the latter, member states were expected to treat foreign producers the 
same as they  would domestic producers once the foreign good had entered into the 
domestic market.  However, the GATT also allowed for temporary exceptions to these 
rules if the measures could be supported on grounds that did not constitute arbitrary and 
unjustifiable discrimination or trade barriers.  As important as these basic principles were, 
the GATT also benefited from its original functioning as a small club of like-minded 
states committed to these general principles.  Consequently, the initial system retained a 
degree of ambiguity and left significant political autonomy with the member states so 
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these states had more flexibility  dealing with domestic politics (Barton et al. 2006; 
O'Brien et al. 2000).
 Although these core principles have changed little in the sixty  years since the 
GATT was first signed, the institutional management of international trade has evolved. 
Perhaps the most obvious transformation of the system was the 1995 transition from the 
more provisional GATT to a formal international institution in the WTO.  Within this 
context it is certainly  possible to identify a number of important and ostensibly abrupt 
changes, such as the revised dispute settlement mechanism and the move towards 
regularly scheduled meetings, which make the WTO system appear radically different 
from the earlier GATT system.  However, it is also important to couch these changes 
within the broader evolutionary shifts that  have occurred throughout the GATT and the 
WTO systems, such as addition of new members and the expansion of issues areas 
considered during negotiations.  When taken together, the abrupt and evolutionary 
changes illustrate how the multilateral system for managing trade has changed in 
significant ways while remaining remarkably similar.
 There are three seemingly abrupt changes created by the transition from the 
GATT to the WTO that stand out in particular.  First, when viewed as an arbiter for 
international trade disputes, perhaps the most important structural change to accompany 
the transition included the creation of a dispute settlement system aimed at  fixing the 
perceived problems the old system.  Specifically, the biggest threat to the continuing 
legitimacy  of the GATT had been the ability  of member states to block either the creation 
of a dispute panel or the adoption of the panel report (Alter 2003).  In the WTO, dispute 
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panels are now automatically created when a complaint is received and the panel reports 
are automatically adopted unless there is a consensus that  it be rejected.  Thus, in 
principle, the WTO dispute settlement process seemingly  allows for a greater chance that 
agreements will be implemented and that the rules-based nature of the international trade 
system will be strengthened (O'Brien et al. 2000).
 Besides modifying the dispute settlement process, a second structural change 
made by the transition from the GATT to the WTO involved the establishment of a built-
in agenda for negotiations that occur during biannual ministerial meetings.  Originally, 
GATT members were called together to open and close meetings that occurred at various 
intervals from one another.  The Dillon Round from 1960 to 1961 was followed three 
years later by the Kennedy Round from 1964 to 1967 but six years separated that round 
from the Tokyo Round from 1973 to 1979.  Consequently, a commitment to biannual 
meetings was intended to create continued momentum for further trade liberalization, but 
it also keeps the entire trade system squarely in the view of the public and the groups 
most interested in trade-related policy (O'Brien et al. 2000).
 A final important  change resulting from the transition to the WTO has been an 
opening up of the system to the public and interested parties in ways that the GATT never 
had.  Such efforts have included placing the text of all agreements and dispute panel 
findings on the internet.  Similarly, the WTO has actively  sought input from NGOs in the 
form of both general position papers submitted to the organization and amicus briefs 
submitted in conjunction with the dispute settlement process.  Such efforts were not 
attempted in the earlier GATT system because, in part, the states retained a certain 
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amount of autonomy and flexibility with regards to satisfying domestic groups interested 
in trade-related polices.  Consequently, the successes and the failures of the GATT never 
drew as much public attention and the interest groups that did care about trade policy 
seemed content to lobby state governments.
 As significant as the transition from the GATT to the WTO was, these 
transformations did not happen without warning but were a partial response to 
evolutionary  changes that have occurred since the original agreement was signed in 1947 
and have continued even after the transition in 1995.  Specifically, there are at least two 
key evolutionary changes that affected management of the international trading system. 
The first such change involves the gradual expansion of the membership in the GATT and 
the WTO.  The original 1947 agreement was signed by twenty-three member states.  The 
number grew over the next decades, with the Dillon Round involving 26 states, 62 states 
in the Kennedy  Round, and 123 in the Uruguay  Round.  The total number of members 
plays an important role in rounds of negotiation because the GATT strove for consensual 
agreements.  Consequently, the agreements that are reached must appeal to the lowest 
common denominator, which can be significantly more difficult in reaching when there 
are 123 members than when there are 23.  Another consequence of this growth has been a 
shift away from dominance of the trade system by  the United States and a rise in 
dominancy by other states, notably those of the Europe (Barton et al. 2006).
 The second evolutionary change includes the expanding scope of the GATT and 
the WTO.  Tariff reductions were the subject of negotiations during the first rounds, from 
1947 to 1961, where the focus was on product-by-product tariff reductions among the 
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member states.  The Kennedy Round, from 1964-1967, brought about tariff reduction 
across the board as well as the GATT Anti-Dumping Agreement and a section on 
development.  At the Tokyo Round, from 1973 to 1979, tariff reductions continued to 
play  an important role but the focus had further expanded into the reduction of other, 
non-tariff barriers.  And by the Uruguay Round, from 1986 to 1994, the subjects included 
tariffs, non-tariff barriers, agriculture, textiles and clothing, intellectual property, as well 
as ten other topics.  Just as important as these changes, however, has been the gradual 
expansion of the GATT and the WTO into areas that are not solely related to trade and 
that seem to stretch beyond the original competencies of these organizations.
 All together these transformations imply that the multilateral system for managing 
international trade has changed in profound ways from its beginnings in 1947 while 
remaining committed to basic principles that underlie the original GATT system.  The 
traditional market approach has been replaced with a more hierarchical, political system 
that resulted from a shifting emphasis on policy autonomy.  The original design of the 
GATT ensured the autonomy of the member states themselves.  By  contrast, the structure 
of the WTO diminishes the amount of autonomy individual states have in an effort to act 
more effectively and legitimately in establishing rules for international trade as well as 
arbitrating disputes between member states (O'Brien et al. 2000).
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Theory
 To better understand why nongovernmental organizations directly  engaging the 
World Trade Organization represents an interesting puzzle, it is important to understand 
the conventional explanations that dominate contemporary  international relations theory. 
Borrowing from Mayer (1998), it  is possible to classify these explanations as belonging 
to the rational choice mode of politics.  Here the actors are generally  assumed to have 
stable preferences over the prospective outcomes and to adopt strategies that are expected 
to yield the highest value after considering their options and the likely outcomes.   Who 
exactly  the actor is in these explanations is contingent on the level of analysis employed. 
As noted previously, international relations theory can be divided into international-level 
explanations operating at the international level of analysis, with an emphasis placed on 
negotiations between states.  Domestic-level explanations, meanwhile, operate at the 
domestic levels of analysis and emphasize the importance of domestic politics.
 International-level explanations focus on organizations like the WTO as rules and 
enforcement mechanisms that help states overcome the anarchic system and achieve 
international cooperation.  The prisoner’s dilemma is often used to explain the basic 
predicament that states face.  Consequently, the central dilemma is that although all 
governments could benefit from international cooperation by adopting cooperative 
strategies, these same governments have strong incentives to not adopt such strategies. 
However, states can also create international organizations to provide constraints and 
rules that structure political, economic, and social interactions within the international 
system (Keohane 1984; Martin and Simmons 1998; North 1991). International 
organizations are created to facilitate cooperation by helping states resolve, or at least 
minimize, this core strategic problem.
 Using this international-level approach it  is possible to describe the creation of the 
GATT system in 1947 as being rooted in the interest of like-minded states that wanted to 
establish a framework for preventing the beggar-thy-neighbor policies that contributed to 
the Great Depression.  When designing such an institution, however, the relative 
flexibility afforded by  emphasizing state autonomy allowed the members of the GATT to 
deviate from rules when necessary, and this ambiguity was seen as essential for helping 
states deal with domestic politics (Barton et al. 2006; O'Brien et al. 2000).  Additionally, 
by focusing on more flexible rules, the earlier GATT system was able to avoid explicitly 
laying out rules that would have made it  easier to define the winners and losers, thereby 
potentially threatening support for efforts to liberalize international trade (Goldstein and 
Martin 2000).
 These international-level explanations can also provide at least a partial account 
for the various changes experienced throughout the last sixty years of the GATT and the 
WTO.  Changing the unilateral nature of the dispute settlement mechanism in the GATT, 
for example, was rooted in efforts to combat the importance of state autonomy and the 
threat it posed to the legitimacy of the system (Alter 2003).  States that could take 
unilateral positions tended to be the economically  powerful states, while smaller states 
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were less likely  to challenge the powerful states for fear of the devastating consequences 
of a trade war (O'Brien et  al. 2000).  Within this context, the changes made to the 
international trade system from the GATT to the WTO were intended to enhance the 
overall international trade system by  helping increase benefits to all members (Goldstein 
and Martin 2000).  From the international-level approach, such reasoning helps explain 
why even the great powers within the international trade system would willingly create 
an institution that limits autonomy and power (North 1991).
 Whereas international-level explanations focus on interactions between states, 
domestic-level explanations of international relations focus on domestic politics.  Here it 
is common for explanations to rely  on positive theories to explain the trade-offs faced by 
politicians and interest groups.  Economic theories of regulation, for example, contend 
that the state, and its ability to regulate, can be either a potential resource or a hazard to 
groups within a society and that these groups will seek to affect regulations in a manner 
most likely  to benefit them (Stigler 1971).  Therefore, politicians and political parties will 
supply regulations to groups in the way they feel will most likely  maximize their chance 
of winning an election.  
 The special interests considered in all of these domestic-level models are tied to 
the various economic interests of the groups lobbying the government.  The nature of the 
interest groups most likely to lobby the government in these models depends upon beliefs 
tied to two different frameworks for understanding how economic interests translate into 
political activity  (Fordham and McKeown 2003).  In sectoral models, like Ricardo-Viner, 
the export-oriented sectors are most likely to win whereas the import-competing sectors 
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will lose from increased international trade.  Conversely, Hecksher-Ohlin models predict 
gains from trade for the abundant factor within a state while the scarce factor loses 
because of increased competition from the rest of the world.
 Within endogenous tariff theory, the locus for interactions between politicians and 
interest groups generally  focuses on efforts to win elections.  In some instances the 
political parties set their policy  positions and then different interest groups choose 
whether to support  them or not in order to increase the chances that a given candidate 
wins the election (Hillman and Ursprung 1988; Magee et  al. 1989).  Others argue 
incumbent governments use international trade issues to help maximize political support 
for reelection by focusing on the desires of interest groups offering support against the 
deadweight losses that might be felt by  society  as a whole (Hillman 1982).  Or, interest 
groups might be the ones to offer the government a menu of choices, and the 
contributions they make are a function of which items the government selects from this 
menu (Grossman and Helpman 1994).
 Domestic-level explanations look to the preferences of interest groups within the 
states in order to understand why  the GATT was adopted while the International Trade 
Organization was unlikely to ever be ratified by the United States (Aaronson 2001; 
Barton et al. 2006).  Here, for example, the pattern of tariff measures covered by  the 
original GATT agreements included many areas important to American exporters so they 
could gain greater access to foreign markets.  Similarly, important shifts in voter 
preferences have occurred within the dominant states in the international trade system 
that have made it difficult to find support  for free trade (Barton et al. 2006).  From the 
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perspective of the domestic-level literature, such shifts might explain why governments 
would support  a reduction in their autonomy as a way  to bind their hands or why states 
will defect from cooperative agreements even when a viable enforcement mechanism is 
in place (Goldstein 1996; Goldstein and Martin 2000; Oatley 1999).
 Research that ties together both international-level and domestic-level processes 
typically takes the form of two-level games (Putnam 1988).  But there is a limit to the 
type of questions such games can answer because they ultimately rely  upon the state to 
act as a gatekeeper between these two levels.  In particular, the central question that 
frames this dissertation is centered on NGO behavior that seems to step outside of this 
two-level game.  What is missing from these state-centered explanations is whether or not 
changes at either the international level or the domestic level could alter the behavior of 
NGOs in ways that do not necessarily require the state to act as mediator.  Whether, for 
example, institutional change at  the international level or mobilization at the domestic 
level could drive these NGOs to seek out new methods for influencing policy  and 
marketing their cause.
 If direct engagement between NGOs and the WTO falls outside of the standard 
two-level approach, it fits within the multi-level framework that connects these different 
actors together.  Such multi-level frameworks have been developed principally  to explain 
the evolution of the European Union, and it is possible to detail three key assumptions 
that may prove useful for considering NGO involvement with the WTO.  First, multi-
level arguments do not reject the notion that sovereign states may be the single most 
important set of actors in the system, but they do recognize the existence of other actors; 
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second, policy-making responsibilities are shared among a variety  of actors; and, third, 
the various political arenas are interconnected, rather than nested, with one another 
(Hooghe and Marks 2003; Marks et al. 1996).
Rethinking the Framework
 In order to move towards an understanding of why NGOs engage the WTO 
directly  and of whether this interaction matters for outcomes, the conceptual framework 
used to explain the interactions of states, non-state actors, and international organizations 
must be changed.  Doing this requires moving away from the straight-line framework of 
traditional international relations theory and towards a triangular conceptualization of the 
system.  In either case, the three groups of actors can be thought of as separate points but 
each framework connects these points together differently.  The straight-line framework, 
see Figure 2.1, connects the non-state actors to the state and the state to the international 
organizations but a triangular framework connects each point to the other two.  As such, 
utilizing this triangular conception of the trade regime can better illustrate the differences 
that exist between the GATT and the WTO.
Figure 2.1: The Straight-Line Framework
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 In particular, a triangular view of the relationships within the trade regime makes 
it is possible to incorporate the insights of traditional international relations theory  while 
also viewing the current trade regime more along the lines of a multilevel system of 
government.  As Figure 2.2 demonstrates, the triangular view does not preclude the 
existence of a “straight-line” system whereby one side of the triangle is blocked and non-
state actors, for example, must work through states in order to influence politics at  the 
international organization.  The market-like, intergovernmental structure of the GATT 
system, with both its emphasis on state autonomy and its limited focus on tariffs and 
other border measures, blocked the side of the triangle connecting non-state actors to the 
international organization.  Within this system, any state could stop a dispute from going 
forward or prevent  the adoption of a panel report concerning a dispute.  Similarly, the 
narrow focus of the GATT meant fewer groups would be aware of the potential 
implications that international trade regulations may  have on them.  Ultimately, non-state 
actors that sought to affect international trade regulations had every incentive to work 
through the states and little or no incentive to work with the GATT directly.
Figure 2.2: A Triangular View of the “Straight-Line” Framework
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 Whether by  design or by  accident, the change from the GATT system to the WTO 
has transformed the trade regime into a more confederal-like, multilevel system.  In this 
context, the side of the triangle that connects non-state actors to the international 
organization has been opened so that both sides may interact directly with one another. 
The WTO also makes it impossible for any one state to block the creation of a dispute 
settlement panel or the adoption of the panel report.  Similarly, the WTO has expanded 
beyond just tariffs and border measures into a whole host of issues, like the environment 
and intellectual property rights, that are more likely to get the attention of a variety  of 
non-state actors primarily interested in the non-economic consequences of international 
trade agreements.  By using a triangular framework for the international trade system, 
direct interactions between NGOs and the WTO are not surprising.  Moreover, this 
triangular view can help  explain why some NGOs, particularly those cut off from 
affecting the state directly, would hope to use environmental regulations or labor 
standards tied to international trade agreements as a boomerang-like method for 
influencing those states (Keck and Sikkink 1998).
Figure 2.3: A Triangular Framework
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 At the most general level, international organizations like the GATT and the WTO 
ultimately  define the option sets for these three groups of actors which, in turn, influences 
their behavior (Hall and Taylor 1996; North 1990; Pierson and Skocpol 2002). Under the 
“straight-line” calculus of the GATT, states need not worry about threats to their interests 
because they could veto any such attempts to impinge on their interests.  If a non-state 
actor wanted to affect the international trade regime, it had to work through a state 
because interacting with the GATT was formally  blocked.  Within this type of framework, 
non-state actors that were also prevented from influencing states would have no other 
options for affecting outcomes in the international trade regime.  However, the transition 
to the multilevel calculus of the WTO altered these basic option sets.  States can no 
longer stop actions from being taken against them and must also consider the possibility 
that they will be expected to alter domestic regulations depending on the findings of a 
panel report.  Within the WTO system, the side of the triangle that connects non-state 
actors and the international organization has been opened thereby expanding the option 
set for these actors if they wish to affect states or the trade regime.  
 The abrupt and evolutionary changes to the international trade regime can be 
understood in terms of historical and rational choice institutionalism.  Within rational 
choice institutionalism, for example, institutions are generally  designed in an effort to 
reduce transaction costs and production costs that might exist  without the institutional 
cooperation (Hall and Taylor 1996; North 1990).  The original design of the GATT 
largely grew out of efforts to solve the collective action problem posed by trade barriers 
and a desire to prevent  another Great Depression.  As new members joined the GATT, 
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however, the system evolved to accommodate agreements concerning a wider variety of 
interests as well as the eventual expansion into managing other, non-tariff barriers to 
trade.  The outcome of each round of negotiation was largely the product of strategic 
interactions between the member-states and the agreements themselves embodied the 
lowest common denominator among these members.
 However, that is not to say  that the outcomes witnessed under both the GATT and 
the WTO necessarily represent the preferences of the member states or other actors 
involved in negotiating new agreements. Rational choice institutionalism, in particular, 
utilizes such explanations for describing why an institution survives (Hall and Taylor 
1996).  Instead, it is possible that  the outcomes here are actually  the unintended 
consequences of other, more functional goals.  From this perspective the appearance of 
large groups of protestors in the streets of Cancun, Geneva, or Seattle was likely an 
unintended consequence of moving to a regular schedule of negotiations rather than the 
ad hoc system used by the GATT.  The rationale for setting up regular rounds of 
negotiations had more to do with and institutional interest in maintaining momentum in 
future trade negotiations.
 When taken together, the triangular conceptualization of interactions in the trade 
regime, the importance of institutional structure for shaping the option sets of actors, and 
the long-term historical processes at work provide the basic framework for understanding 
why NGOs would interact directly with the WTO today.  What all of these cannot do is 
make specific predictions about how the various groups of actors are going behave within 
this broader framework.  To be able to make those predictions it is necessary to consider 
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what these actors care about, what these actors can do to get the attention and support of 
other actors, and what determines how successful these actors will be at  getting the 
attention and support they desire.
Explaining NGO Actions
  By rethinking the conceptual framework it is possible to formulate two basic 
hypotheses about why NGOs become involved with the WTO.  These hypotheses can act 
as a basic test of the plausibility of this overall triangular framework.  The first 
hypothesis focuses on the top-down political opportunity structure associated with the 
WTO while the second is a bottom-up hypothesis based on the resource mobilization 
efforts of NGOs.  Regardless of whether these groups are responding to top-down or 
bottom-up pressures, the belief is that they have some goal in mind and some belief about 
how to achieve that goal.  Both hypotheses, therefore, draw upon literature common to 
comparative politics and social movements to examine why such behavior may not be as 
irrational as it first appears from a two-level game approach.  
 Indeed, both of these hypotheses regard NGOs as being procedurally  rational even 
if it is not clear what their substantive preferences are based upon.  For all of these 
NGOs, their involvement with the WTO represents a means toward some end but the 
nature of the end varies depending on the story.  Such engagement may be driven by an 
interest in influencing policy  at the WTO because it affects their cause. Or, it  may reflect 
an opportunity  to use the WTO as a springboard to increasing the visibility  or importance 
of a particular NGO and its cause.
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 The group of NGOs present can be generally subdivided into three broad 
subgroups: economic-based NGOs, value-based NGOs, and epistemic communities. The 
differences between these subgroups correspond roughly to their different motivations 
and different  endowments of political resources (Keck and Sikkink 1998).  Economic-
based NGOs are likely to pursue instrumental goals that are themselves defined by the 
position of the group with both the domestic and the international economy.  Value-based 
NGOs are likely to have goals defined by whatever common ideological, moral, or value-
based belief brought the group together.  Epistemic communities are motivated by shared 
causal beliefs and are likely to pursue goals tied to their technical expertise and 
convincing others of their importance.  
 Very  little is known about the overall level and pattern of NGO involvement with 
the WTO.  Therefore, the emphasis here is not on creating detailed hypotheses about each 
type of NGO, but on capturing basic explanations to help guide learning about these 
groups and their actions vis-à-vis the WTO.  Regardless of whether an NGO is economic-
based, value-based, or an epistemic community, the group  shows up in this analysis 
because it  has stepped outside of the standard two-level game of international relations 
theory to directly engage the WTO.
 Though several studies examine NGOs and the WTO, the focus of these analyses 
tends to emphasize specific types of NGOs, like social movements, or within the context 
of a specific issue, like the environment.  For example, Williams and Ford (1999) 
examine both lobbying efforts and more confrontational approaches between 
environmental social movements and the WTO.  Meanwhile O’Brien et  al. (2000) 
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consider similar issues as well as efforts by organized labor to establish standards at the 
WTO.  Although insightful, neither of these arguments are anchored to a broader analysis 
that describes what proportion of the NGOs involved with the WTO are organized around 
these causes.  Consequently, the analysis offered in these other works will benefit 
immensely from additional observation of NGO participation with the WTO.
A Top-Down Hypothesis: Political Opportunities
 International organizations like the WTO define the opportunity structures, or 
option sets, for other actors, which influence the behavior of those actors (Guidry  et al. 
2000; Hall and Taylor 1996; North 1990; Pierson and Skocpol 2002).  This observation is 
all the more important considering that the rules established in an organization like the 
WTO ultimately shape who wins and who loses from international economic exchange 
(Viscusi et al. 2005).  By privileging state autonomy, the GATT was able to constrain the 
options available to NGOs such that a two-level approach would make sense and these 
groups would work through state governments.  However, the belief the WTO restricts 
state autonomy  leaves NGOs in a situation where they must make international linkages, 
including getting involved with the WTO, to compensate (O'Brien et al. 2000).
 Within this context, it is conceivable that NGOs involve themselves in the 
business of the WTO because they wish to influence policy at the organization.  This may 
be important insofar as they believe the WTO is likely to affect their chances of winning 
or losing at either the international level or the domestic level.  At the international level, 
the rules governing trade are particularly important for economic-based NGOs, but even 
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value-based NGOs may also hope to influence international trade policy  as a way to 
support their cause.  The success of both the GATT and the WTO systems for achieving 
trade liberalization was partially tied to the successful creation of economic coalitions 
supporting exports that were bigger than the coalitions resisting imports (Barton et al. 
2006). Consequently, both the winning and losing NGOs have offered the WTO concrete 
proposals for ways to utilize trade policy to their advantage.
 To better understand the opportunity structure of the WTO system, it is necessary 
to understand both the formal and informal political opportunities for NGOs. Most 
obviously, the WTO has established guidelines indicating a desire to increase contact 
with NGOs and has invited these groups to become involved with the organization. 
However, this invitation does not necessarily  account for the contact insofar as these 
groups could still be better served by engaging the states themselves.  Therefore, it is 
necessary  to consider a number of key changes to the broader context  of the trade regime 
that could also affect the desire of these groups to get involved with the WTO.  This 
context can be divided into the changes associated with the transition from the GATT to 
the WTO in 1995 but also the gradual changes that have characterized the evolving trade 
regime.
 Among the changes associated with the transition from the GATT to the WTO, 
two stand out for altering the opportunity structure available to NGOs.  The first 
important change involves the limits placed on state-autonomy by  the WTO.  In 
particular, the binding nature of judgments made by the WTO means that  an NGO must 
be willing to look beyond the domestic-level if it wishes to protect its favored policies or 
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advocate for changes.  This alters the basic dynamic of the standard, micro-oriented 
explanation of trade policy  because it places limits on the types of policies that a 
government can credibly  offer to domestic interest groups as a way to win their support. 
Consequently, an NGO must be aware of and willing to spend resources on direct 
engagement with the WTO if it has an interest in affecting international trade policies.
 The second important change involves the movement towards a regular schedule 
for trade negotiations.  Utilizing a regular schedule, both for ministerial conferences and 
for symposia, provides NGOs with a better awareness of when and where meetings will 
take place.  As such this schedule provides NGOs with greater incentive to take to the 
streets during a conference to both influence members and the WTO at that conference as 
well as affect the agenda for future conferences.  When combined with the first change 
mentioned, the WTO system also provides an incentive to engage directly with the 
institution so that a group may help set the agenda on the issues it cares about for fear that 
the WTO might otherwise rule against such policies.
 In addition to these two fundamental changes, several others have already been 
highlighted here.  In particular, the size of the organization itself has grown.  The original 
GATT agreement signed in 1947 brought together 23 like-minded member states, but the 
WTO today has grown to include 152 members with a diverse interests.  Similarly, the 
scope of the agreements has changed over time.  The trade regime has moved beyond 
simply  trying to reduce tariff barriers to include a wide variety of measures that may 
distort the promise of free trade.  Some of these measures include issues tied to 
development and trade or the environment and trade.  Both of these changes, to the size 
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and to the scope of the organization, ultimately mean that  a greater number of NGOs will 
have an interest in the policies of the WTO and an interest in getting involved with the 
organization to affect change.
 If the general argument about rethinking the framework that links together states, 
non-state actors, and international organizations is correct, then the expectation here is 
that the NGOs directly  engaging the WTO will reflect this sentiment.  For example, 
attendance and WTO-sponsored events, like the ministerial conferences, will have very 
little turnover with regards to the groups that actually show up because of their concern 
with the structure of the system and their desire to affect change.  Or the NGOs 
themselves will be more likely to express concern about the outcomes at the WTO itself 
because of the affect such outcomes will have on the issues they care more about.
A Bottom-Up Hypothesis: Resource Mobilization
 Separate from the opportunity structures, another important aspect for 
understanding the behavior of NGOs is the mobilizing structures through which they 
organize (Guidry et al. 2000; McAdam et al. 1996a).  Such mobilizing structures are 
important for ascertaining how a group will gain the resources necessary to accomplish 
their goals and can include both external and internal resources (Tarrow 1998).  Given the 
rapid increase in the overall number of NGOs—variously defined as interest  groups, 
social movements, transnational advocacy networks, and so on—there is also increased 
competition amongst  these groups for the resources they need to assert their importance 
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vis-à-vis these other NGOs (Smith 1997).  Consequently, two possible bottom-up 
motivations exist that might lead an NGO to directly engage the WTO.
 In the first  instance, NGOs may be aware of the political opportunities offered by 
the structure of the system, but they  are motivated to engage the WTO for reasons tied to 
their ability to mobilize resources for themselves and their cause.  Such groups may hope 
to assert their position within the overall hierarchy of NGOs by taking charge of 
monitoring policy at the WTO and informing others of actions or decisions that could 
affect their causes.  By contrast, a second bottom-up motivation does not require the 
NGOs to know anything about the opportunities created by the WTO because they are 
ultimately  responding to calls for mobilization from other NGOs.  Although the WTO is 
responsible for the international trade regime, it also represents a more general trend 
towards greater global governance and globalization.  Therefore, it  becomes a viable 
target for NGOs interested in mobilizing for or against global governance and 
globalization regardless of whether they  are formally interested in the functioning of the 
international trade regime.
 To better understand the mobilization opportunities presented by getting involved 
with the WTO, it is necessary  to consider key  external and internal resources that 
characterize this modern system as well as the potential benefits such involvement could 
confer to NGOs.  External resources for mobilizing include the transition to a regular 
schedule of meetings with the WTO.  Here the emphasis is not on the political 
opportunities presented by these meetings as much as the potential press coverage that 
accompanies these meetings.  NGOs that attend ministerial conferences, in particular, 
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may hope the press coverage of the conference will spillover to their causes and 
involvement.  This, in turn, will help them reach a wider audience without having to 
expend as many  of their own resources and without specific regard to the workings of the 
WTO itself.
 From the perspective of internal resources, technological progress has been put to 
great use by NGOs.  A change in how information can be shared within and between 
groups has drastically  altered the resource costs of launching coordinated collective 
action or engaging an organization based continents away.  Additionally, coalitions of 
individuals and groups can be forged online and made aware of the actions of an 
organization, like the WTO, more quickly.  An NGO with an internet connection can 
quickly locate the website of the WTO and find out how to submit position papers to the 
organization.  They  may sign up for email lists from the WTO itself or create their own 
distribution list to keep interested parties informed.  Additionally, the internet is a helpful 
resource to overcome the collective action problem that may occur if groups are forced to 
draw on local members only.  As with the external resources, these internal resources do 
not necessarily require the groups to respond to the WTO itself or simply  the opportunity 
for mobilizing presented by the WTO. 
 Another way  of ensuring that an NGO has access to the resources it needs is to 
prove that it is respected and accepted by external groups, including through its ties to 
international organizations like the WTO.  Here the groups are better aware of the overall 
structure of the system but the motivation still lay with asserting their dominance 
amongst competing NGOs.  By getting involved with the WTO, a trade association, labor 
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union, environmental group, and so on, an NGO may be in a stronger position to assert 
that it is the authority  in dealing with issues regarding labor rights and trade or the 
environment and trade.  As the effects of the other elements influencing mobilizing 
structures lower the barriers for entry  to more NGOs, this element may prove more and 
more important as organizations jockey for position with one another.
 If the general argument about rethinking the framework that links together states, 
non-state actors, and international organizations is incorrect, then the expectation here is 
that the NGOs directly  engaging the WTO will reflect this sentiment.  For example, 
attendance at WTO ministerial conferences will largely involve groups from the host 
country  and region, or potentially  neighboring countries and regions.  Or, correspondence 
among the groups will reflect more of a tone of using the WTO to raise money from their 
members than a concern for the outcomes at the WTO itself.
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The Population of NGOs
 Explaining why certain nongovernmental organizations have chosen to engage the 
World Trade Organization requires knowing more about these groups: where are they 
from, what are their types, and what are the issues they represent?  In 1996 the WTO 
adopted a set of general guidelines outlining its relationship with NGOs.  The WTO did 
so while acknowledging that its member states “recognize the role NGOs can play to 
increase the awareness of the public in respect of WTO activities and agree in this regard 
to improve transparency and develop communication with NGOs” (WTO 1996).  Contact 
between the WTO and these NGOs has generally  fallen into four types: attendance at 
ministerial conferences, submission of position papers, attendance at issue-specific 
symposia, and submission of amicus curia briefs.  Of these four types of contact, 
complete listings of NGO participation is only available for the first two forms, with 
NGO participation at the ministerial conferences beginning in 1996 and the submission of 
position papers beginning in 1998.1
 This chapter develops a general description of the population of NGOs that have 
attended each of the WTO’s first six ministerial conferences: Singapore in 1996, Geneva 
in 1998, Seattle in 1999, Doha in 2001, Cancun in 2003, and Hong Kong in 2005.  The 
1 The WTO does maintain listings of the groups and individuals participating in issue-specific symposia, 
however, these lists are kept confidential.  The WTO does not maintain a centralized listing of the amicus 
curia briefs submitted as part of the dispute settlement process as those records are deemed confidential to 
the cases themselves.  This was confirmed via personal communications with the WTO during June and 
July of 2008.
information that is presented here comes from two principle sources: the WTO for the 
listings of the organizations that attended each conference and their country of origin and 
the Yearbook of International Organizations (UIA 2009) for details on the type of the 
organizations and the issues they  represent.  Using this information, it is possible to 
evaluate the plausibility of the theoretical argument and hypotheses presented in the last 
chapter.  This can be done by looking, first, at the frequency of attendance by this 
population of NGOs and at how the composition of this population has changed over 
time.  Second, by looking at the attendees at each individual conference and, third, by 
examining more closely the linkages between these groups.
 Although the information presented here is largely descriptive, the simple act of 
cataloging the NGOs that have attended WTO conferences is an important for first step  in 
developing a population ecology  of these groups.  Such an ecology would examine in 
greater detail how the population described here is constrained by the environment that 
has been created at the WTO (Lowery and Gray  1995).  Before for such an analysis can 
be undertaken, the scope of the population must  be established.  In doing so it also 
becomes possible to get a better sense of understanding why  these groups engage the 
organization directly.  For example, NGOs that attended all of the conferences could be 
those groups that are interested in the top-down affect the WTO has on their areas of 
interest.  Conversely, NGOs that have attended only one conference or those that attended 
only conferences in their region could be driven more by the bottom-up forces than a top-
down concern with the WTO itself.  As such, the description of this population  presented 
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here represents an important first step that has hitherto been missing from the discussion 
examining NGOs and the WTO.
Describing the Population of NGOs: Attendance
 Not long after the World Trade Organization first adopted its general guidelines 
regarding interaction with nongovernmental organizations it also adopted procedures for 
registering groups that wished to attend ministerial conferences.  Specifically, NGOs 
could register to attend the plenary sessions so long as the group could demonstrate their 
activities involve “matters related to those of the WTO” (Article V:2).  These rules were 
in place before the first ministerial conference in Singapore and have been in place ever 
since.  Figure 3.1 shows the overall number of NGOs that not only registered by also 
attended each of the six ministerial conferences.
Figure 3.1: Total Number of NGOs
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 Summing attendance at all of the ministerial conferences to date, there are a total 
of 3,115 separate instances of NGOs attending WTO conferences.  Specifically, this 
number represents the total number of times that 1,738 different NGOs have attended the 
6 ministerial conferences.  For the purposes of this analysis, these groups represent 
distinct entries on the lists of NGOs attending WTO conferences.  This total controls for 
variation in the name of an organization by language.  For example, the World 
Confederation of Labour appears by that name on the lists for the Singapore, Geneva, 
Cancun, and Hong Kong conferences; however, it appears as Confédération Mondiale du 
Travail on the Seattle and Doha conference lists. This total number also controls for name 
changes over time.  For example, the United Nations Environment and Development UK 
Committee transitioned to a new name, Stakeholder Forum, between 2000 and 2004.
 Besides controlling for these differences and changes, this complete listing of 
1,738 NGOs also distinguishes between different members of affiliated networks.  For 
example, the Agricultural Technical Advisory  Committee for Trade in Animal and Animal 
Products and in Fruits and Vegetables are treated as two separate groups because they 
both attended the Seattle conference.  SImilarly, the German Marshall Fund of the United 
States as well as its Berlin office are treated as two separate groups because, in part, they 
both attended the Hong Kong conference.  There are approximately 54 readily 
identifiable networks of affiliated groups, which includes 226 NGOs where the individual 
groups are treated as distinct organizations in this population ecology.2
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2 It has proven difficult to identify all potential networks of affiliated groups or partner beyond, at this 
point, those who share similar names.  For example, there are thirteen distinct Greenpeace organizations or 
seventeen distinct Oxfam organizations that show up on the WTO’s lists.
 Using this information it  is possible to determine the number of times that each 
NGO attended one or more ministerial conference.  Table 3.1 breaks down the number of 
NGOs by those that attended one, two, three, four, five, or six ministerial conferences. 
Only 19 NGOs, or 1.1 percent, attended all of the WTO’s ministerial conferences while 
984, or 56.6 percent, attended only one of the conferences.  Of the affiliated networks that 
have been identified thus far, only  four have attended all six conferences even if no one, 
specific organization in the network was present at every conference.3
Total # 
Attended
Singapor
e
Geneva Seattle Doha Cancun Hong 
Kong
Total
6
5
4
3
2
1
19 19 19 19 19 19 19
15 25 32 25 31 32 32
27 30 127 99 130 115 132
8 20 123 84 176 150 187
12 17 132 86 287 234 384
27 19 306 52 318 262 984
Table 3.1: NGO Attendance By Overall Frequency of Attendance
 It is also possible to look at how this overall composition of groups has changed 
with time as a means for further understanding this population and their overall 
likelihood of attendance.  Perhaps the most interesting is with the overall frequency of 
36
3 The four networks are Consumers International, Friends of the Earth, Oxfam, and the Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council.  In all four of these networks, at least one organization has attended five of the six 
conferences.  Consumers International, the group, and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, the 
group attended every conference except the 2001 meeting in Doha.  Friends of the Earth USA attended 
every conference beginning with Geneva in 1998 while Friends of the Earth Netherlands attended every 
conference except Geneva.  Oxfam UK also attended every conference beginning with Geneva.
attendance itself.  Implicit in the original figures was the belief that each of the 1,738 
NGOs that  did attend a WTO conference was available to attend every conference.  Table 
3.2 looks at the same frequency  numbers but only  reports them for the new groups, those 
that have not attended a previous conference.  Unfortunately, however, these numbers 
still do not control for whether or not the group was in existence prior to its first  meeting 
or if the group ceased to exist subsequently.
Total # 
Attended
Singapor
e
Geneva Seattle Doha Cancun Hong 
Kong
Total
6
5
4
3
2
1
New Groups
19 0 0 0 0 0 19
15 17 0 0 0 0 32
27 25 80 0 0 0 132
8 16 106 57 0 0 187
12 13 120 48 191 0 384
27 19 306 52 318 262 984
108 90 612 157 509 262
Table 3.2: First-Time Attendees at Each Conference
 This view of attendance highlights two dynamics with regards to the new groups 
in attendance.  First, the total number of new groups at any given frequency  rises as time 
passes and, with the exception of groups attending three total conferences, the single 
largest number of new NGOs at each level is at the last conference where that overall 
level is possible.  For example, of the 132 NGOs that attended at least four conferences, 
60.6 percent of these groups first attended the Seattle conference.  At that point it  was 
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only possible for them to attend four total conferences.  Consequently, regardless of why 
these groups did not attended Singapore or Geneva or why they decided to first attend 
Seattle, these groups went on to attend all subsequent conferences.
 Second, the proportion of new groups that  only  attended that first  conference was 
at or below 50 percent for Singapore, Geneva, Seattle, and Doha, and that number was at 
or below 25 percent for the first two ministerial conferences held.  The spikes in the 
proportion of groups that only attended one conference correspond to the three 
conferences with highest overall attendance by  NGOs.  Although it is not yet possible to 
tell how many of the 262 that first  attended the Hong Kong conference might go on to 
attend additional conferences when they have the opportunity, it  does seem telling that 
67.7 percent of the groups at  this conference had already attended at least one other WTO 
meeting.
 By looking at the different groups level attendance as such, it  seems that 20.9 
percent of the 1,738 NGOs took full advantage of attending every meeting after their first 
encounter.  Additionally, the proportion of groups doing this increased with new 
conference, with the only real exception being the conference in Doha.  Indeed, 84 of the 
106 groups, or 79.2 percent, that attended three conferences beginning with Seattle 
skipped Doha but attended both Cancun and Hong Kong.  Taken together all of this data 
suggest that small but growing group of NGOs exhibit some concern for the top-down 
structure of the system and are willing to travel anywhere to attend WTO conferences. 
Conversely, this data also suggests that a large number of the groups could be responding 
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to bottom-up  pressures for resource mobilization and are attending conferences that are 
convenient.
Describing the Population of NGOs: Countries and Regions
 It is also possible to use the information provided by the WTO to ascertain the 
countries of origin for the 1,738 NGOs that have attended these ministerial conferences.4 
The WTO does not  provide specific countries of origin for all attendees on the Singapore 
and Geneva conferences so this information was gathered using the Yearbook of 
International Organizations and other sources.5   Depending on the organization, the 
country  of origin that was assigned represented the location of its headquarters or 
secretariat, for international groups, or the country where an office was located if a 
specific office was given.6   For example, the German Farmers Association is listed as 
being from Germany while the Brussels Office of the German Farmers Association is 
listed as being from Belgium.
 Altogether these NGOs come from 111 different countries.  However, a majority  
of these groups, 884, come from five countries and the top  10 countries of origin 
represent 1,139, or 65.5 percent, of all NGOs.  Conversely, 33 of those countries have 
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4 One group that attended the Geneva conference does not have a country of origin as it is only listed as the 
Department of City and Regional Planning without any further specification as to its affiliation or origin.
5 Among the other sources used were the Encyclopedia of Associations: International Organizations (2009) 
and online directories of organizations such as the one provided by Consumers International.  Where 
possible the information gathered from these sources was also compared to information provided by the 
NGOs on their individual websites.
6 During the Seattle, Doha, Cancun, and Hong Kong conferences a total of 85 NGOs have mismatched 
countries of origin between the WTO listing and information gathered from these other sources.  For the 
purposes of the analysis, the countries of origin gathered from these other sources are used for all six 
conferences to ensure that the same set of information is being used.
only one group  listed and 68 countries have five or fewer groups.  The United States is 
the country of origin for the single largest number of NGOs overall, 499 or 27.1 percent, 
as well as the largest number of NGOs at all of the ministerial conferences except 
Singapore.  Included in this list of is one group, the International Confederation of Arab 
Trade Unions, that comes from a country that is not a member of the WTO, Syria.  Nine 
of thees NGOs also come from eight countries that are presently listed as observers to the 
WTO.
 Table 3.3 lists the top ten countries of origin overall as well as the number of 
groups from each of these ten countries at the six conferences.  The number in 
parentheses is the rank for that country at that conference.  For example, Canada 
represented the country of origin for the second largest number of NGOs overall as well 
as for the Seattle, Cancun, and Hong Kong conferences.  Canada was the country of 
origin for the fourth largest number of NGOs at Singapore and Geneva and the fifth 
largest number at Doha.
 It is also possible to group the countries into nine basic regions of the world. 
Table 3.4 lists these regions, the countries of origin from each region, as well as the total 
number of NGOs from each country.  Although groups representing all nine of these 
regions have been present for at least one conference, well over half of these groups, 65.2 
percent, come from North America and Western Europe.  North America represents the 
single largest region of origin for 36.7 percent of NGOs.  However, Western Europe 
represents the largest region of origin at all of the ministerial conferences except Seattle 
and it is tied with North America for the most NGOs at Cancun.
40
Top Ten 
Countries
Singa-
pore
Geneva Seattle Doha Cancun Hong 
Kong
Total 
NGOs
USA
Canada
Belgium
UK
France
Japan
Switzerland
India
Germany
Australia
13 (2) 30 (1) 310 (1) 65 (1) 236 (1) 184 (1) 499
8 (4) 10 (4) 64 (2) 21 (5) 86 (2) 75 (2) 139
7 (6) 8 (5) 40 (4) 40 (2) 58 (3) 50 (3) 88
14 (1) 11 (3) 36 (5) 25 (4) 46 (5) 40 (6) 80
7 (6) 5 (7) 42 (3) 36 (3) 57 (4) 50 (3) 78
4 (8) 3 (10) 24 (7) 18 (7) 41 (6) 44 (5) 65
8 (4) 17 (2) 26 (6) 15 (8) 34 (8) 29 (7) 57
3 (9) 4 (8) 13 (11) 20 (6) 35 (7) 26 (8) 53
3 (9) 4 (8) 14 (10) 11 (9) 30 (10) 25 (10) 43
1 (19) N/A 12 (13) 7 (12) 15 (14) 25 (10) 37
Table 3.3: Top Ten Countries of Origin
Region Total 
NGOs
Countries
Australia & New Zealand
East Asia & the Pacific
Eastern Europe &
Central Asia
Latin America &
the Caribbean
Middle East & North Africa
46 Australia (37), New Zealand (9)
189 Cambodia (1), China (5), Fiji (3), Hong Kong (20), 
Indonesia (4), Japan (65), Korea (13), Malaysia (8), 
Philippines (35), Samoa (1), Singapore (14), Taiwan 
(5), Thailand (13), Vietnam (2)
17 Azerbaijan (1), Croatia (1), Czech Republic (2), 
Georgia (3), Kazakhstan (1), Macedonia (1), Poland 
(1), Romania (1), Russia (1), Turkey (4), Ukraine (1)
132 Argentina (6), Barbados (1), Bolivia (6), Brazil (26), 
Chile (7), Colombia (8), Costa Rica (3), Dominican 
Republic (1), Ecuador (6), El Salvador (3), Guatemala 
(4), Haiti (1), Honduras (2), Mexico (26), Nicaragua (2), 
Paraguay (3), Peru (6), Trinidad & Tobago (1), Uruguay 
(7), Venezuela (3)
24 Egypt (7), Iran (1), Israel (3), Jordan (5), Lebanon (1), 
Morocco (1), Saudi Arabia (1), Syrian AR (1), Tunisia 
(4)
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Region Total 
NGOs
Countries
North America
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Western Europe
638 Canada (139), United States (499)
87 Bangladesh (12), India (53), Nepal (9), Pakistan (10), 
Sri Lanka (3)
109 Benin (3), Botswana (1), Burkina Faso (2), Cameroon 
(3), Central African Republic (1), Chad (1), DR Congo 
(3), Ghana (7), Guinea (1), Ivory Coast (3), Kenya 
(15), Madagascar (2), Malawi (1), Mali (2), Mauritius 
(1), Mozambique (1), Namibia (1), Niger (1), Nigeria 
(2), Rwanda (1), Senegal (4), South Africa (22), Sudan 
(2), Tanzania (3), Togo (3), Uganda (11), Zambia (6), 
Zimbabwe (6)
495 Austria (10), Belgium (88), Denmark (10), Finland (4), 
France (78), Germany (43), Greece (1), Iceland (1), 
Ireland (5), Italy (16), Luxembourg (3), Netherlands 
(29), Norway (28), Portugal (2), Spain (30), Sweden 
(9), Switzerland (57), United Kingdom (80), Vatican (1)
Table 3.4: Regions of Origin7
The Population at Each Ministerial Conferences
 So far the aim has been to describe the general population of NGOs that have 
attended the six ministerial conferences based on attendance and origins.  Of all the 
numbers describing this group the one that stands out the most is 19, the total number of 
NGOs that have attended all six of these conferences.  If the general argument about the 
need to rethink our understanding of the system is correct, and by extension the first 
hypothesis, then this number seems far too low when compared to the total number of 
NGOs that have attended these conferences, 1,738.  Additionally, the notion that 56.6 
percent of these NGOs only attended one WTO conference could be confirmation that 
42
7 One group that attended the Geneva conference does not have a country of origin as it is only listed as the 
Department of City and Regional Planning without any further specification as to its affiliation or origin.  
Consequently this group is not included in either the Total NGOs column or with any of the countries in 
this table.
many of these groups showed up because of bottom-up efforts to mobilize resources and 
NGOs.  If these groups were truly aware of and concerned with the structure of the 
international trade system it seems like more would have regularly  attended these six 
conferences.
 Conversely, the fact that the United States is the country  of origin for more groups 
at every conference except for the first could be seen as evidence that American groups 
are willing to travel just about anywhere to attend a WTO conference even if that might 
affect their reach when it comes to local coverage of the conference.  Furthermore, 
looking at the top five countries of origin for each of the ministerial conferences reveals 
that this group only includes eight countries.  Seven are in the top ten countries of origin 
overall; indeed, they  are the top seven countries of origin.  Only Singapore makes an 
appearance in the top five of a conference, the first one in Singapore, and is 21st overall 
with regards to the total number of NGOs.  But what about the groups that attended each 
of the ministerial conferences?  What can a detailed look at each of the NGO attendees at 
each of these conference tell about why  these groups may or may  not have decided to 
engage the WTO directly?
Singapore, 1996
 The general rules providing for NGO interactions with the WTO were clarified in 
July of 1996, only  five months before the first ministerial conference.  Altogether 158 
NGOs registered to attend the conference and 108 actually  showed up in Singapore. 
Table 3.5 highlights the number of NGOs from the host country, the host region, and 
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neighboring regions as well as their attendance for the other conferences and total NGOs. 
Overall this conference included NGOs from twenty-seven different countries and six of 
the nine regions.  There were no NGOs in attendance from Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, or Sub-Saharan Africa.
Singa-
pore
Geneva Seattle Doha Cancun Hong 
Kong
Total 
NGOs
Singapore
East Asia &
the Pacific
Neighboring 
Regions
13 2 2 0 2 2 14
26 8 48 32 84 133 189
6 6 34 36 75 80 150
Table 3.5: Singapore NGOs - Host Country, Host Region, Neighboring Regions
 Perhaps the most noticeable piece of information here is the overall lack of 
participation by NGOs from Singapore at subsequent WTO conferences.  This may be 
evidence that  for these groups the bottom-up benefits of attending a local ministerial 
conference won out  and, even after attending this conference, twelve of these groups 
were not concerned enough with the WTO itself to want to attend any  subsequent 
conferences.  However, one of these groups, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, 
went on to attend every  conference except Doha and another group based in Singapore, 
the ICFTU - Asian and Pacific Regional Organizations, attended every  conference except 
this one and the conference in Doha.  Both of these organizations can be located in the 
Yearbook  and reflect groups whose interests expands beyond that of just Singapore which 
could explain why they remained interested in the WTO.
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 NGOs from host and neighboring regions represented only 27.9 percent of the 
108 NGOs in attendance.  By contrast, groups from North America and Western Europe 
made up 66.7 percent.  The United Kingdom was the country of origin for the largest 
number of groups, fourteen, and the United States was tied for second with Singapore 
with thirteen NGOs.  Also, the number of NGOs that attended this conference and could 
be found in the Yearbook of International Organizations was 51.9 percent, the highest 
overall proportion of found to missing out of all six conferences.  These factors suggest 
that a sizable number of the organizations in attendance were willing to travel great 
distances to participate in the first experience between NGOs and the WTO at a major 
ministerial event.  As such, these groups lend support to conclusions of the top-down 
hypothesis that there some NGOs, perhaps even a majority  here, are aware of the 
structure of the system and are concerned about the WTO.
Geneva, 1998
 The second ministerial conference was held in May of 1998 and although slightly 
fewer groups registered when compared to the first, 152 versus 159, more groups 
attended the conference itself, 130.  Table 3.6 highlights the number of NGOs from the 
host country, the host region, and neighboring regions as well as their attendance for the 
other conferences and total overall NGOs.  This conference included NGOs from 31 
different countries as well as seven of the nine general regions.  The only  two regions that 
did not have any  groups in attendance were Australia and New Zealand and Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia.
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Singa-
pore
Geneva Seattle Doha Cancun Hong 
Kong
Total 
NGOs
Switzerland
Western 
Europe
Neighboring 
Regions
8 17 26 15 34 29 57
51 63 224 165 322 264 495
0 4 6 15 18 10 41
Table 3.6: Geneva NGOs - Host Country, Host Region, Neighboring Regions
 Unlike Singapore, this conference does not represent the high-water mark for 
NGO attendance at WTO conferences from Switzerland-based groups.  Of the subsequent 
conferences only the Doha meeting had fewer total Swiss groups in attendance.  Indeed, 
looking at the frequency  of attendance for all 57 NGOs from Switzerland, there were 
more groups that attended only  one conference at Seattle, Cancun, and Hong Kong 
meetings than those in attendance at this conference.  Even all eight of the groups that 
attended the Singapore conference would attend at least two more meetings, albeit only 
five of those eight groups attended the meeting in Geneva.  This suggests that a sizable 
number of groups from Switzerland remained concerned about the WTO across all six 
conferences.  Of course, this could also reflect the overall number of international 
organizations that are based in Switzerland, fully 42 of the 57 NGOs from Switzerland 
can also be found in the Yearbook.
 The Geneva conference also differs from Singapore in that the host region is the 
largest region of origin of NGOs in attendance with 48.8 percent.  When combined with 
its neighboring regions these NGOs account for just over half of all groups in attendance. 
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However, the overall proportion of groups from the host region is not all that different 
from the overall proportion of groups that attended the Singapore conference, 48.8 
percent in Geneva versus 47.2 percent in Singapore.  Consequently it is difficult to say if 
the number of NGOs at this conference rose because of the proximity of the meeting 
itself or because concerns related to the business of the WTO.  Twenty-nine of the fifty-
one Western European NGOs that attended the Singapore conference also attended this 
conference in Geneva.  For 11.1 percent  of the NGOs from Western Europe this 
represented the only time they attended a ministerial conference.
 This ministerial conference was similar to Singapore in that the country of origin 
for the largest number of NGOs comes from outside the host region or neighboring 
regions.  In fact, beginning with this conference, the United States is the country of origin 
for the largest number of NGOs at the rest of the WTO conferences.  Surprisingly, 
however, only  one of the American-based NGOs that attended Singapore also attended 
this conference, while this represented the first conference attended by the other twenty-
nine groups from the United States.  Consequently, it is possible to say that American-
based NGOs may care enough about the WTO to travel anywhere but it is unclear 
whether they got enough of what they wanted out of that first experience to continue to 
care about the top-down structure of the system.
Seattle, 1999
 The third ministerial conference was held in Seattle scarcely sixteen months after 
the Geneva conference. Perhaps the most  noticeable difference between the two was the 
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total number of NGOs in attendance.  Whereas Geneva drew 130 groups, Seattle drew 
739, a more than fivefold increase.  Table 3.7 highlights the number of NGOs from the 
host country, the host region, and neighboring regions as well as their attendance for the 
other conferences and total overall NGOs.  Altogether these NGOs came from sixty-three 
different countries and, for the first time, all nine of the regions of the world.  At 
subsequent conferences the overall number of countries of origin never falls below this 
level again and at least one group from all nine regions is always in attendance.
Singa-
pore
Geneva Seattle Doha Cancun Hong 
Kong
Total 
NGOs
United States
North America
Neighboring 
Regions
13 30 310 65 236 184 499
21 40 374 86 322 259 638
4 5 34 11 87 29 132
Table 3.7: Seattle NGOs - Host Country, Host Region, Neighboring Regions
 Seattle differs from the five of the other conferences in that it is the only time the 
largest number of NGOs in attendance come from the host country and the host region. 
Although the United States is the largest country of origin at five of the six conferences, 
this is the only  conference where attendance by American-based groups exceeds the total 
number of NGOs from Western Europe, 310 to 224.  This conference also represents the 
only meeting where the North American groups in attendance outright exceed those from 
Western Europe.
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 Although the population ecology  here cannot explain the significant rise in NGO 
attendance or why slightly more than ten times as many American-based groups attended, 
it can still offer some insights.  For example, half of the 310 NGOs from the United 
States attended only  the Geneva conference and 27 of the 69 groups that attended just 
two conferences only attended Seattle and Cancun.  It is likely that  these 183 groups, or 
59 percent of the American total, represent groups that were driven by  the bottom-up 
desires for resources given the proximity  of these meetings to where they are based. 
More generally this conference also stands out for having the highest proportion of 
groups that only attended one WTO conference, 41.4 percent.
 Conversely, of the 282 American NGOs whose first  ministerial contact with the 
WTO came in Seattle, 13 would go on to attend the next three conferences while 48 
would go on to attended two more conferences, and 66 attended one more conference. 
Regardless of whether these NGOs first arrived in Seattle because of top-down or 
bottom-up concerns, their continued attendance at subsequent meetings could reflect an 
interest in the top-down structure of WTO itself, especially  for those groups willing to 
travel to Doha and Hong Kong.  More generally, half all groups who first attended a 
WTO conference in Seattle would go on to attend at least one more conference.
 The publicity  that accompanied the so-called Battle of Seattle could have also had 
a more general affect on the overall awareness of the WTO.  Consequently  it may be all 
the more difficult to determine whether groups that attended subsequent conferences were 
truly  motivated by top-down concerns or if those groups were aware of of the structure 
but their attendance was influenced by the bottom-up need to mobilize.  This may be 
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especially true of groups, like Public Citizen, that had not attended either Singapore or 
Geneva but  would attend the rest of the ministerial conferences.  Public Citizen, and its 
Global Trade Watch, invested resources in raising awareness about the Seattle meetings 
and then continued its involvement with the WTO as a way to reinforce its position 
among the NGOs involved.
Doha, 2001
 The fourth ministerial conference was held in Doha almost two full years after 
Seattle.  If Seattle was noticeable for the rapid rise in NGO attendance, Doha is just  as 
noticeable for the rapid decline in attendance, as the total number of NGOs dropped from 
739 to 365.  However, the number of groups that attended the Doha conference was still 
three times more than those that attended the Singapore or Geneva conferences.  Table 
3.8 highlights the number of NGOs from the host country, the host region, and 
neighboring regions as well as their attendance for the other conferences and total overall 
NGOs.  Despite the overall drop in attendance from Seattle, the NGOs at Doha came 
from sixty different counties and, again, all nine regions of the world.
 Doha differs from all of the other conferences in that the host country has not had 
a single NGO attend any of the six conferences, let  alone the one held within the country 
itself.  This conference also has the smallest overall proportion of groups from the host 
region at only 3.8 percent.  Albeit, this conference does have the largest number of NGOs 
from the Middle East and North Africa in attendance.  The United States is again the 
country  of origin for the largest number of NGOs, with 17.8 percent of the total, and 
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Western Europe is again the region of origin for the largest number of NGOs, with 45.2 
percent.
Singa-
pore
Geneva Seattle Doha Cancun Hong 
Kong
Total 
NGOs
Qatar
Middle East & 
North Africa
Neighboring 
Regions
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 4 3 14 12 2 24
56 72 267 213 438 359 708
Table 3.8: Doha NGOs - Host Country, Host Region, Neighboring Regions
 In many  ways the conference in Doha looks like it could be a prime example of 
NGOs responding to the top-down structure and an interest  in the WTO itself.  The 
proportion of NGOs that attended only one conference is at its lowest, 14.2 percent, and it 
has the proportion of groups that  attended at least three or four total conferences, 23 and 
27.1 percents respectively.  Altogether the neighboring regions account for 58.4 percent 
of all groups, the highest proportion of all neighboring regions, but only 15.5 percent of 
those 213 groups have not or will not attended another WTO conference.  Even among 
groups from the United States, only 7.7 percent have not or will not attend another WTO 
conference, down from 50 percent at Seattle.  However, it is difficult to distinguish 
between the groups at Doha concerned with the top-down structure of the system versus 
those aware of the structure but motivated by bottom-up concerns because of the 
publicity that had been generated by Seattle.
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Cancun, 2003
 Had the conference in Cancun come immediately following the Seattle 
conference, the overall growth in NGO attendance would have been proportionally 
consistent with the growth from Singapore to Geneva.  However, with the Doha 
conference between Seattle and Cancun, it seems the dramatic increase in number of 
NGOs may  have reflected pent up  desires to continue what had been started in Seattle. 
Table 3.9 highlights the number of NGOs from the host country, the host region, and 
neighboring regions as well as their attendance for the other conferences and total overall 
NGOs.  Altogether there were 961 NGOs at Cancun from a total of 82 different countries 
in all nine regions of the world.
Singa-
pore
Geneva Seattle Doha Cancun Hong 
Kong
Total 
NGOs
Mexico
Latin America 
& Caribbean
Neighboring 
Regions
1 2 2 0 34 5 36
4 5 34 11 87 29 132
21 40 374 86 322 259 638
Table 3.9: Cancun NGOs - Host Country, Host Region, Neighboring Regions
 Although NGOs from the host country and the host region represent only 9.1 
percent of the overall number of groups in attendance, the breakdown of the overall 
population of NGOs looks more like that of Seattle than any of the other three preceding 
conferences.  Cancun does represent the high-water mark for both Mexico and Latin 
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America and the Caribbean, which could reflect an interest in bottom-up pressures to 
mobilize given the proximity  of the conference.  Of the NGOs from Mexico, fully 79.4 
percent attended this and only this conference.  Perhaps just as interesting, this was the 
last conference attended by  the three groups that had been to previous meetings, and only 
four of the Mexican groups here went to the next meeting in Hong Kong.  This 
conference represented the only conference attended by 72.4 percent of the total number 
of NGOs from Latin America and the Caribbean.
 The United States was once again the country  of origin for the largest number of 
NGOs, with 236, and this was the only conference attended by 31.4 percent of those 
groups.  Of the 73 American-based groups that attended only  two conferences, 27 had 
been attendees at the Seattle conference.  From a regional perspective, both North 
America and Western Europe tied as the region of origin for the most NGOs, with 322 
total each.  For North America this number is second only  to the number of groups that 
attended the Seattle conference and might reflect bottom-up pressures tied to resource 
mobilization.  Among the groups from North America this represented the only 
conference attended by 95 groups and another 65 only attended Seattle and this 
conference.
 However, this also represents the conference with the largest number of groups 
from Western Europe, surpassing Seattle by 98, Doha by 157, and Hong Kong by 58.  Of 
these 322 Western European groups, this was the first conference attended by 127 and, of 
that number, 55.9 percent did not attended the next conference.  Put differently, 77.9 
percent of these groups had already attended or would attend another WTO conference. 
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As such it seems that a large number of these NGOs were at least aware of the WTO and 
cared enough to attend multiple meetings but these numbers alone cannot explain 
whether this was just because of concerns with the system itself or with the need to be 
seen attending the conference for its own sake.  Among other regions of the world, this 
conference also represented the one with the largest number of groups from South Asia, 
51, and from Sub-Saharan Africa, 59.
Hong Kong, 2005
 The total number of NGOs that attended the WTO conference in Hong Kong fell 
from the high reached in Cancun, from 961 to 812, however Hong Kong still had the 
second highest number of NGOs in attendance of all six conferences.  This conference 
also marks the first time that one region played host  to a second conference.  Table 3.10 
highlights the number of NGOs from the host country, the host region, and neighboring 
regions as well as their attendance for the other conferences and total overall NGOs. 
Altogether the 812 groups at Hong Kong came from 69 different countries of origin in all 
9 regions of the world.
 The overall numbers for the Hong Kong conference most  resemble the Cancun 
meeting.  This conference represents the largest overall attendance by groups from both 
the host  country  and the host region.  Of the 19 groups from Hong Kong, this was the 
first and only meeting attended by 15 of them and this is the only time that groups from 
the People’s Republic of China appear on the WTO’s list of conference attendees.  Forty-
seven percent of groups from East Asia and the Pacific had never attended a WTO 
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conference prior to Hong Kong.  Consequently there is a sizable contingent  of locally-
based NGOs that  could be at this conference because of the bottom-up concerns with the 
need to organize and attend the meeting.
Singa-
pore
Geneva Seattle Doha Cancun Hong 
Kong
Total 
NGOs
Hong Kong
China
East Asia &
the Pacific
Neighboring 
Regions
2 0 2 1 3 19 20
0 0 0 0 0 5 5
26 8 48 32 84 133 189
28 8 50 33 87 157 150
Table 3.10: Hong Kong NGOs - Host Country, Host Region, Neighboring Regions
 This conference also saw the largest number of participants from two neighboring 
regions, Australia and New Zealand, as well as from Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
Interestingly  enough, nine fewer groups from South Asia showed up to this conference 
than had shown up to Cancun, the most widely attended conference for that region.  The 
United States was once again the country of origin for the largest number of NGOs, with 
184, and Western Europe was once again the region of origin for the largest number of 
groups, 264.  For the NGOs from the United States, this represented the only conference 
attended by over 25 percent.  This was also the only conference attended by over 20 
percent of the groups from Western Europe.  Given the distances involved with traveling 
to Hong Kong from either North America or Western Europe, it would appear these 
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groups cared about the WTO but it unclear as to whether they were motivated to go by 
those concerns or, again, by  a desire to promote themselves and their role within the 
overall population of NGOs.
 Until the WTO holds another ministerial conference it  may be impossible to fully 
gauge the motives that brought some of these groups to this particular conference for the 
first time.  However, the fact that this conference has the largest number of groups from 
the host country  and the host region fits with the pattern that emerged beginning with 
Seattle.  Using this pattern it seems that there maybe some underlying, bottom-up motive 
that draws in NGOs from the host country or especially  region and even neighboring 
regions because of the proximity of the conference.  However, the overall analysis of 
each of these conferences also suggests that is still a core group of NGOs, especially  from 
North America and Western Europe, that  is willing to travel around to world in order to 
attend WTO conferences.
Further Defining the Population of NGOs
 Knowing how frequently  an NGO has attended WTO ministerial conferences and 
where these groups are from are important first steps for understanding who these groups 
are but so is learning more about  the subject areas that these NGOs represent.  In 
particular, it is possible to take the overall list of 1,738 NGOs and find out more about 
each group  by examining the information about them that has been collected in the 
Yearbook of International Organizations.  Specifically, 437 of these groups can be 
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located and therefore it is possible to describe in more detail both the types of these 
organizations as well as the issue areas these groups represent.8
 Although the number of NGOs found in the Yearbook represents only 25.1 percent 
of all NGOs, this may  serve as a useful proxy for the groups with an international 
orientation and, therefore, more likely to participate in the system because of their ties to 
IGOs, the top-down reason, or because of their role within the group of NGOs, a bottom-
up reason.  The missing groups, on the other hand, may include many of the NGOs that 
showed up because of calls to mobilize or a desire to attend the conferences since they 
were local.  Figure 3.2 shows the proportion of groups at each ministerial conference and 
that were found in the Yearbook versus those that could not be found.  Approximately 
half of the groups at Singapore, 51.9 percent, and Geneva, 50.8 percent, can be located in 
the Yearbook.  However, that number drops to close to one quarter for the succeeding 
conferences.  The Hong Kong meeting had the lowest proportion of groups found in the 
Yearbook, 24.6 percent.
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8 Originally this project used the book edition of the Yearbook of International Organizations, however, 
with the cooperation of the library at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, I was able to get 
access to the online edition of the Yearbook at www.uia.be/yio from March 1 - 31, 2009 and from January 1 
- February 28, 2010.  Among the benefits of the online edition were its regular updates and the inclusion of 
more NGOs to search through, 53,392 online versus 29,912 in the book edition.  Particularly useful here 
was the online versions inclusion of so-called inactive bodies because, as discussed later, these groups 
make up 9.1 percent of the NGOs that were found in the Yearbook but are excluded from the print edition.  
The online database also provides a more thorough listing of the types and subject areas, connections to 
other groups, funding, languages, locations, and staff size for each of the NGOs listed.
Figure 3.2: Proportion of NGOs Found in Yearbook By Conference
 Figure 3.3 examines the proportion of groups by their overall frequency  of 
attendance.  Notably, the proportion of groups that could be found in the Yearbook goes 
up as the frequency of their attendance rises.  Whereas only  21.1 percent of groups that 
attended only one ministerial conference can be found, 84.2 percent of the groups that 
attended all six conferences can be found.  Additionally, Western Europe has the largest 
proportion of groups that can be found in the Yearbook versus those that are missing, 42.8 
percent while Eastern Europe and Central Asia had the lowest proportion with 5.9 
percent.
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Figure 3.3: Proportion of  NGOs Found in Yearbook by Attendance Frequency
 Using information gathered from the Yearbook of International Organizations, it  
is also possible to describe the types of organization that have attended each of the six 
ministerial conferences.  Table 3.11 lists the number of groups from each of seven distinct 
types that have attended each of the conferences as well as the overall number of each 
type of groups.  The largest groupings of NGOs are National II, with 36.6 percent of 
found groups, and International II, or 31.4 percent of found groups.  The seven categories 
employed here are based on combinations of the Type 1 classifications used in the 
Yearbook of International Organizations.
Found Missing
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
1 2 3 4 5 6
59
Type Singa-
pore
Geneva Seattle Doha Cancun Hong 
Kong
Total
Inter-
national I
Inter-
national II
Regional
National
I
National
II
Other
Inactive
12 11 23 9 24 22 37
20 26 70 38 87 69 137
4 5 21 22 33 21 46
0 0 2 0 7 4 10
16 16 79 40 97 74 160
0 1 1 0 2 1 2
3 6 20 5 19 7 40
Table 3.11: Number of NGOs by Type9
 Here International I corresponds to types A, B, and C in the Yearbook and 
represents conventional international bodies such as federations of international 
organizations, universal membership  organizations, and intercontinental membership 
organizations.10  Examples of this type include Consumers International, the International 
Chamber of Commerce, or World Vision International.  International II represents types E 
and F in the Yearbook, which are other international bodies that emanate from persons, 
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9 Five of the organizations located in the Yearbook of International Organizations did not include 
information regarding their type and are missing from this table.  Of these five groups, one was in 
attendance at Singapore, Geneva, Seattle and Doha, four were present at Cancun, and two were at Hong 
Kong.
10 The Yearbook of International Organizations defines conventional international organizations as 
autonomous intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations of a non-profit nature and with 
members in at least three countries as well as activities or decision-making processes designed to not favor 
a specific country.
places, products or other bodies as well as foundations and funds.11  Examples of this 
type include Greenpeace International, Health Action International, and the Third World 
Network.  Regional groups, those listed as type D in the Yearbook, are conventional 
international bodies like International I but membership is regionally  defined.  Examples 
of this type include the African Cotton Association, the European Broadcasting Union, 
and the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions.
 The groups classified as National I are those listed as type N in the Yearbook of 
International Organizations.  Examples include the Fair Trade Resource Network, the 
Information Technology Industry Council, and Water Advocates.  National II groups 
correspond to type G and represent national organizations with an emphasis on 
international subjects.  Examples of this type include Africare based in the United States, 
Chatham House from the United Kingdom, and the Heinrich Böll Foundation based in 
Germany.  Of the affiliate networks that have been identified, those with groups found in 
the Yearbook will often include groups of this type with one or more overarching groups 
classified as International I or II.  For example, Oxfam Australia is listed as a National II 
organization because it  is Australian national organization with an international 
orientation and is a member of Oxfam International, an International II organization.
 Besides these five primary categories, two additional categories are employed 
here.  First, Other corresponds to types J, K, and R in the Yearbook.  These groups 
represent special sections or unconfirmed bodies that could be part of a religious order, 
fraternities, or secular institutes as well as subsidiary bodies of other international 
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11 The groups categorized as International II and National II here correspond to the other international 
organizations in the Yearbook of International Organizations that do not meet the criteria for the groups in 
the International I and Regional categories.
organizations.  Second, Inactive corresponds to types H and U, which are also special 
sections or unconfirmed bodies that have been reported as inactive or dissolved.  For 
example, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions shows up as inactive in 
this database because that organization merged with the World Confederation of Labour 
to form the International Trade Union Confederation in 2006.
 Table 3.12 lists the total number of NGOs by each type and their regions of origin. 
The United States represents the country  of origin for the largest number of the NGOs 
found in the Yearbook, 27.2 percent, and a slight  majority of those groups, 64 of 119, are 
classified as National II.  By contrast, Western Europe represents the largest region of 
origin of these NGOs, 48.5 percent, including 34 of 46 Regional organizations.  Outside 
of North America and Western Europe, only  East Asia and the Pacific have more than 5 
percent of the NGOs found in the Yearbook.  And only  one of seventeen groups from 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia can be found in the Yearbook, the Russian-based Centre 
for Environment and Sustainable Development.
Regions I I I II Reg. N I N II Other Inactiv
e
Total
Australia &
New Zealand
East Asia &
the Pacific
Eastern 
Europe & 
Central Asia
Latin America 
&
the Caribbean
0 1 0 0 5 0 0 6
0 14 1 0 8 1 1 25
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 7 4 0 2 0 4 17
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Regions I I I II Reg. N I N II Other Inactiv
e
Total
Middle East &
North Africa
North America
South Asia
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
Western 
Europe
1 2 3 0 0 0 1 7
3 37 2 8 75 0 15 140
0 4 0 0 3 0 1 8
0 7 2 1 4 1 3 18
33 65 34 1 62 0 15 210
Table 3.12: Number of NGOs by Type and Region of Origin12
 The Yearbook of International Organizations also provides information that can 
be used to classify the issues represented by these 437 organizations.  Specifically, the 
Yearbook  provides a matrix of subjects that takes into account variation within broad 
categories, for example by splitting ideas like “nature” into both the physical sciences and 
the biosphere.  The Yearbook  does this to help distinguish between subjects tied to 
innovative change or development and those more closely tied to descriptive sciences and 
theory.  Ultimately, the matrix includes ten rows that correspond to the description and 
concrete actions within the material world, reflections on those acting in the material 
world, and, perhaps less tangible, the experiences in their own right.  There are also ten 
columns that provide information for varying degrees of beliefs about the necessary 
actions or the actions to be taken by these NGOs.  For example, distinctions are made for 
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12 Five of the organizations located in the Yearbook of International Organizations did not include 
information regarding their type and are missing from this table.  Of these five groups, two are from North 
America, one is from Sub-Saharan Africa, and two are from Western Europe.
the differences between those seeking to establish something versus those that aim to 
consolidate something.
 Altogether 75 of the 100 possible matrix cells are covered by groups that have 
attended the six ministerial conferences.  In some cases, one group can actually be found 
in multiple cells because of the issue areas with which it is concerned.  For example, 
Russia’s Centre for Environment and Sustainable Development is listed in both the 
environment cell and the development cell.  Table 3.13 presents the fifteen most common 
subjects as well as the number of NGOs of these types at each ministerial conferences.13
Top 15 
Subjects
Singa-
pore
Geneva Seattle Doha Cancun Hong 
Kong
Total 
NGOs
Development
Social Activity 
(Employment)
Commerce 
(Finance)
Society
Innovative 
Change
Peace
(Justice)
Industry 
(Production)
21 22 57 36 72 58 125
11 24 56 34 68 46 114
16 19 57 30 66 51 112
11 14 39 24 58 44 100
14 21 41 28 59 43 95
12 15 32 25 51 34 76
7 10 38 23 48 38 70
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13 Plotting these fifteen common subject areas into the Yearbook matrix shows that nine of these categories 
involve groups dealing with the actual practice, or social action, associated with their issue areas: Social 
Activity (Employment), Commerce (Finance), Society, Industry (Production), Amenities (Necessities), 
Agriculture and Fisheries, Societal Problems, Research and Standards, and Law.  Two of these subject areas 
involve areas dealing with concept formation and theories: Economics and Environment.  Three of these 
subject areas involve the developmental principles associated with change and only one of these groups, 
Principles, involves the more existential experience: Development, Innovative Change, and Peace (Justice).
Top 15 
Subjects
Singa-
pore
Geneva Seattle Doha Cancun Hong 
Kong
Total 
NGOs
Amenities 
(Necessities)
Environment
Agriculture, 
Fisheries
Societal 
Problems
Economics
Research, 
Standards
Principles
Law
9 13 26 20 35 33 57
13 13 30 11 35 22 49
3 7 20 11 24 21 45
7 8 26 16 23 16 45
9 11 16 9 29 20 42
8 9 16 5 23 15 42
7 6 17 9 22 17 37
5 6 15 11 24 16 36
Table 3.13: Top Fifteen Subject Areas from the Yearbook of International Organizations
 The largest  subject area for this group of NGOs is Development.  Examples of 
groups involved in this issue include ActionAid International, Doctors Without Borders, 
and the World Development Movement.  Social Activity (Employment) groups include 
many trade unions and professional organizations like the Central Organization of Trade 
Unions in Kenya, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and the Trade Union 
Advisory  Committee to the OECD.  Commerce (Finance) groups include NGOs linked to 
contextual issues involving the redistribution of resources like the Business and Industry 
Advisory  Committee to the OECD, the Arab Society  of Certified Accountants, and the 
Pacific Basin Economic Council.  The relatively large presences of groups from all three 
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of these categories is not surprising given that each subject is likely to have interests tied 
to their position within the international trade system.  Development and assistance 
groups, for example, have sought to affect trade agreements in ways that would help 
increase the flow of cheaper, generic medication to the developing world.  Members of 
the other two subject areas have been involved, for example, on all sides of debates 
regarding the implementation of core labor standards within trade agreements.
 Society, the fourth largest issue area for groups, involves those acting with society 
and not necessarily  reflecting on society.  Examples of groups in this issue area include 
Development groups like ActionAid International, again, and other NGOs like 
Stakeholder Forum of the United Kingdom and Worldwatch Institute.  Among these 
groups one of the common goals has been to raise awareness of the affects that 
international processes have on groups even within society.  Innovative Change groups 
differ from development groups in that innovative change relies more on structure-
centered social action than responding to the specific context of an area.  Examples of 
these groups include Amnesty International, Environmental Development Action in the 
Third World, and Women and Children International of Saudi Arabia.  Although such 
groups may document conditions in specific contexts, they seek to implement 
internationally recognized rights or standards, which could include concerns about how 
the WTO implements trade rules or the use of such rules to reinforce other standards, 
such as human rights or environmental protection.  A number of these groups overlap 
with the sixth largest issue area, Peace (Justice), and also includes ActionAid 
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International and Amnesty International as well as other groups like, Earthjustice and 
Earth Rights Institute.
 Industry (Production) groups include many associations of producers like the 
Association of the Chocolate, Biscuit and Confectionery Industries of the EU, the 
International Mass Retail Association, and Toy  Industries of Europe.  Groups involved in 
the Amenities (Necessities) issue area include those linked to contextual renewal of 
resource such as the Agriterra Foundation of the Netherlands or the Food First 
Information and Action Network of Germany.  In both of these areas, the groups included 
have an interest in affects of the WTO on their own economic or material well-being.
 The Environment issue area, the ninth largest group of NGOs, includes examples 
like Greenpeace International, the Sierra Club, and the World Wide Fund for Nature. 
Agriculture, Fisheries groups represent many agricultural groups as well as some which 
are also in the Amenities (Necessities) and Environment categories.  Examples include 
the European Dairy  Association, Global Crop Protection Federation, and the Rainforest 
Action Network.  The Societal Problems issue area includes groups that are concerned 
with basic imbalances in the functioning of society, including crimes, crime prevention, 
disasters, and safety  issues.  NGOs that have attended WTO conferences from this issue 
area include Amnesty International, Earthjustice, and the Women's International League 
for Peace and Freedom.  Although the groups in these areas may be motivated by 
economics, values, or both, all three of these issue areas include groups that harbor 
concerns about the role of the WTO in the reduction or removal of barriers that protect 
their interests in the name of freer trade.  Conversely, some of the NGOs in these subject 
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areas believe that influencing the WTO could be the key to spreading or reinforcing their 
preferred policies through trade-related rules.
 Groups that fall into the Economics issue area differ from those in Commerce 
(Finance) insofar as the emphasis here is on the more theoretical emphasis on issues of 
resource redistribution.  Examples of NGOs that fit into this issue area include the 
Australian APEC Study Centre at Monash University, the Drug Study Group of Thailand, 
and the World Federation of United Nations Associations.  Research, Standards includes 
a number of groups in the Economics category  as well as other NGOs like, for example, 
the Asia-Pacific Research Network, the Centre for Applied Studies in International 
Negotiations in Switzerland, and the Institute for Global Networking, Information and 
Studies from Norway.  Both of these categories fall more closely to the epistemic 
community  form of NGO insofar as these groups study subjects related to, and 
consequently affected by, the rule of the trade system.
 The Principles category represents the largest  number of NGOs that  fit into a less-
tangible, more existential category that  could relate to any number of substantive issues. 
Examples of the NGOs that fit into this category include the American Friends Service 
Committee, Canadian Feminist Alliance for International Action, and Development 
Alternatives with Women for a New Era.  However, this category also includes groups 
like Birdlife International and the World Wide Fund for Nature.  The Law category 
rounds out the top fifteen of the overall subject  areas covered by  these 437 NGOs. 
Among the examples of groups in this category are those whose substantive areas are tied 
to other categories like the Center for International Environmental Law and the Drug 
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Study Group of Thailand.  Other examples include the Berne Declaration, the 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, and the Forum for International Commercial 
Arbitration.  The groups in this category  are also similar to epistemic communities in that 
they  reflect an expertise in legal matters and have an interest in the legalistic and judicial 
role the WTO plays within the international system. 
 Beyond these top fifteen categories, a further nine include between twenty and 
thirty-five NGOs.  Among these issue areas are groups tied to Government and Politics, 
Solidarity (Cooperation), Transportation and Telecommunication, Health Care, Policy 
Making (Futurology), Action, International Relations, Communication (Media), and 
Resources (Energy).  The next twelve categories include between ten and nineteen 
NGOs.  The issues covered by these twelve groups include Geography (Ecology), 
Education, Harmony, Theology, Idealism, Religious Practice, Co-operative, 
Consciousness, Fundamental Sciences, Information (Documentation), Plant Life, and
Technology.  An additional thirty-nine categories include nine or fewer NGOs.14
Evaluating the Hypotheses
 Using the Yearbook of International Organizations, it  is also possible to learn 
more about the resources and linkages of each of these NGOs in a manner that allows for 
the use of multivariate analysis to better understand which factors likely contributed to 
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14 The categories that include nine or fewer NGOs are: Conservation, Defense (Police), Medicine, 
Metapolitics, Freedom (Liberation), Informatics and Classification, Recreation (Arts, Sports), Climatology 
Management, Zoology, Biosciences, Culture, Cybernetics (Systems), Earth, Science, Security, Strategy and 
Logistics, Birds and Mammals, Hydrology, Leadership (Authenticity), Philosophy, Sharing, Sociology, 
Agroscience, Community, Comprehension, Experiential Activities, Geology, Integration, Life, Love 
(Compassion), Mankind, Oceanography, Purpose, Vigilance (Courage), Aesthetics, Creative Expression, 
Equanimity, and Fish and Reptiles.
the overall level of attendance by these groups.  Among the entry items for many of the 
groups listed is a brief history that describes when it was found and whether or not it has 
subsequently  ceased operations or merged with other groups.  This information is useful 
for developing a better picture about which of these groups was actually available to 
attend any  given WTO ministerial conference.  Additional information listed in the 
Yearbook  describes the scope and resources of the group  itself, including the number of 
official or working languages, the size of the staff, the amount of funding, and the 
number of countries and territories where the membership of the NGO originates or 
where it  has offices and programs.  Beyond the basic scope and resources of these groups, 
the Yearbook also lists the connections that each one has to IGOs and NGOs.
The Dependent Variable
 The dependent variable used in the analysis is the ratio of the number of 
conferences that an NGO attended to the number of conferences that were available for 
the NGO to attend.  Utilizing this ratio better accounts for groups that were created after 
1996 or ceased operations prior to 2005.15   3D - Trade - Human Rights - Equitable 
Economy, a Swiss NGO, only  attended the last two ministerial conferences, or 33 percent 
of the WTO ministerial conferences, but this group actually attended every conference it 
was able to attend since it was founded in 2003.  Similarly, INZET - Association for 
North South Campaigns, a Dutch NGO, attended three conferences, from Geneva to 
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15 In instances where the date founded or ceased coincides with a ministerial conference, every effort was 
made to establish the actual date the group was founded or ceased to exist.  However, if this could not be 
established, the group was coded as being available for the conference held during that year.  It was also 
impossible to determine the year that 25 of these groups were founded, which prevents the calculation of 
ratio variable.  Of these groups, one attended 5 conferences, one attended 4 conferences, two attended 3 
conferences, five attended 2 conferences, and the rest attended only 1 conference.
Doha, or one half of the total.  However, it merged into Environment and Development 
Service for NGOs, another Dutch NGO, in January  2003 so it had actually attended 75 
percent of the conferences it was available to attend.
 A key reason for using this ratio as the dependent variable rather than attendance 
at the individual conferences themselves is the nature of the data collected from the 
Yearbook.  Since this data was collected in the Spring of 2009 and 2010, it reflects 
information about these groups today and not necessarily  the scope, resources, and 
connections of these groups at the time of the individual conferences.  The online 
database provided by the Yearbook is updated regularly and dates of modification for the 
records included in this analysis vary from 2000 to 2009.
The Independent Variables
 The three main independent variables in the analysis capture the connections that 
each NGO has with IGOs and other NGOs.  These are the three variables that most 
closely approximate the two general hypotheses presented here and significant results for 
them would support the general arguments laid out  about both the top-down and the 
bottom-up motivations for attending WTO ministerial conferences.16  The first variable 
counts the number of IGOs with which an NGO has consultative status.  Here 
consultative status reflects that  the particular IGO believes that the NGO can offer useful 
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16 In instances where no links between the NGO and these organizations were listed in the Yearbook, the 
number of links is set to 0.  Similarly, if an NGO’s record listed an unspecified number of contacts, then 
only those connections actually listed in the Yearbook were utilized for this analysis.  By using the online 
database to gather information about these linkages, additional groups were listed that do not appear in the 
printed version of the Yearbook.  These additional linkages represent ties that are a bit more tenuous than 
those appearing in the printed version but are included here as a way to capture a more complete picture of 
an NGOs’ connections.
contributions to the work conducted by  the IGO.  Of the NGOs found in the Yearbook, 
41.4 percent are listed as having consultative relations with one or more IGOs.  The 
expectation here is that these linkages tie a group more closely to the top-down structure 
of the international system and would increase the likelihood of attendance for those 
reasons.  Consequently, as the number of consultative relationships rises, so to should the 
likelihood of attending WTO ministerial conferences.
 The second key variable counts the number of IGOs with which a NGO has some 
type of relationship  aside from a consultative relationship.  In such instances the group 
may have contact with an IGO, but they  are not necessarily  recognized by that IGO as a 
potential source for input on the matters central to the IGO.  Over half, 66.2 percent, of 
the NGOs analyzed here have some connections to an IGO.  The expectation here is that 
a larger number relationships with IGO, will increase the likelihood that an NGO will 
attend more WTO ministerial conferences.  However, it is not clear if these linkages 
necessarily reflect a top-down interest in the structure of the system or, perhaps, a 
bottom-up interest in establishing themselves as an NGO with connections to IGOs.
 Finally, the third key variable counts the number of NGOs with which the NGO 
has some type of relationship.  The nature of these relationships varied, often by the 
nature of the other NGO.  UBUNTU - World Forum of Civil Society  Networks is itself a 
network of NGOs so many of its members are listed on their records as having an NGO 
relationship.  However,  these same NGOs are not listed as having an NGO relationship 
with UBUNTU - World Forum of Civil Society Networks since they  are that 
organization’s members.  Overall, 86.2 percent of the NGOs in the analysis have some 
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form of relationship with other NGOs.  The expectation here is that as the number of 
these relationships increase, the more likely a group will be to attend a WTO ministerial 
conference because of bottom-up mobilization of groups and resources.
 In addition to these three variables, three control variables have been included 
based on information from the Yearbook.  The first  control variable is the average 
distance from the headquarters, or the the secretariat, for that group to the conference 
locations.  These distances were calculated using the latitudinal and longitudinal 
coordinates for the city listed as the headquarters and the coordinates for the conference 
city.  The average distances among these groups ranged from 3856 to 7526 miles, and the 
average of this variable was 4583 miles.  The expectation here is that an increase in the 
distance that these groups must travel to attend the conferences will have a negative 
effect on the likelihood these groups will actually attend conferences.
 The second and third control variables help account for the breadth of an 
individual NGO within the international system.  The second variable is the number of 
official and working languages used by an organization.  The third is the number of 
countries and territories within which the NGO is active.  This includes the location of 
the membership  for the NGO or the offices and programs of the NGO.  The expectation 
here is that the more official and working languages used by an NGO or the wider 
international footprint  of an NGO, the more likely the group is to attend WTO ministerial 
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conferences.17  Regardless of their connections to IGOs or NGOs, these groups might be 
more interested in the WTO as a forum that affects all of the locations in which they are 
active.
 Out of this set of NGOs, 76.3 percent have only  one language listed while the 
other 23.6 percent have two or more languages.  The most languages listed for one group 
is 8, for both the International Metalworkers' Federation and Union Network 
International.  The total number of NGOs listing more than three languages is 8.7 percent. 
Of this group  of NGOs, 40 percent are located within one country, 16.4 percent are listed 
as being in three countries or territories, and 43.6 percent operate in four or more 
countries and territories.  Education International has the largest overall footprint with 
member unions in 171 countries and territories.
The Results
 Examining the bivariate correlation matrix, Table 3.14, between these 
independent variables and the dependence variable shows that all of eight are 
significantly correlated with the ratio of the number of WTO ministerial conferences a 
group attended if it  was available to attend.  It  is also noticeable that the three primary 
independent variables are significantly correlated with one another and that the Pearson 
correlation coefficients for each is above .50.  It makes sense that these three variables 
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17 Where the number of languages was missing from the Yearbook, the value for this analysis was set to 1.  
The records in the Yearbook does not always specify whether or not the languages listed were official or 
working, hence both are included here as one number.  Where the number of locations for the membership 
or offices and programs was missing, the analysis here entered a 1 for groups of National I and National II 
and a 3 for groups of International I, International II, and Regional types.  Three is the minimum number of 
countries that an NGO must be active in to qualify as international by the criteria used in the Yearbook.  
The Yearbook does not break out different numbers for countries and for territories.
would be significantly correlated since 89.2 percent of the NGOs listing consultative 
relationships also have IGO relationships and 94.4 percent have NGO relationships. 
Similarly, 55.8 percent of the NGOs listed with IGO relationships have consultative 
relationships and 91.8 percent have NGO relations.  Finally, 45.4 percent of the groups 
listed with NGO relationships also have consultative relationships and 70.7 percent have 
IGO relationships.
Consult 
Status
IGO 
Relations
NGO 
Relations
Average 
Distance
Language Locations Attend / 
Available
Consult 
Status
IGO 
Relations
NGO 
Relations
Average 
Distance
Language
Locations
Attend / 
Available
1
.585**
N = 427
1
.503**
N = 427
.579**
N = 425
1
-.162**
N = 426
-.159**
N = 426
-.132**
N = 424
1
.335**
N = 427
.288**
N = 427
.277**
N = 425
-.182**
N = 426
1
.552**
N = 426
.377**
N = 426
.412**
N = 424
-.173**
N = 425
.495**
N = 426
1
.291**
N = 401
.196**
N = 401
.118*
N = 399
-.194**
N = 401
.174**
N = 401
.175**
N = 400
1
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 3.14: Bivariate Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables and Dependent Variable
 Given the results of this bivariate correlation analysis, Tobit regression analysis 
was used to judge the relative weight  of each of these independent variables on the 
likelihood that an NGO attended a greater proportion of the WTO ministerial conferences 
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they  were available to attend.  Tobit  analysis was used in this case because the dependent 
variable, as a ratio, is constrained between 0 and 1.  The results of three different models 
are provided in Table 3.15.  The first model includes the three primary variables that 
measure the number of other groups with which an NGO has relationships.  The second 
model adds the average distance variable, while the third model incorporates both the 
language and location variables.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Consult Status
IGO Relations
NGO Relations
Average Distance
Language
Locations
Constant
Observations
0.04695*
(0.09832)1
[4.77]2
0.04474*
(0.00973)
[4.60]
0.04517*
(0.01069)
[4.23]
0.00247
(0.00247)
[1.00]
0.00110
(0.00244)
[0.82]
0.00171
(0.00244)
[0.70]
-0.00102
(0.00110)
[-0.95]
-0.00113
(0.00107)
[-1.06]
-0.00113
(0.00107)
[-1.05]
-0.00005*
(0.00002)
[-3.14]
-0.00005*
(0.00002)
[-2.91]
0.01639
(0.01123)
[1.46]
-0.00029
(0.00049)
[-0.59]
0.35151*
(0.01568)
[22.41]
0.59578*
(0.07945)
[7.50]
0.55876*
(0.08265)
[6.76]
399 399 398
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Likelihood Ratio
Chi Squared
Pseudo R23
38.89 48.60 50.93
0.3292 0.4114 0.4349
* = p < .01.  1 Figures in parentheses are standard errors.   2 Figures in brackets are t-values.  3 This is 
McFadden’s pseudo R-squared as Tobit regression does not have an equivalent to the R-squared values 
found in OLS regression.
Table 3.15: NGO Attendance Tobit Regression Results
 Looking at  the results of this Tobit regression, the only variable of interest  that is 
statistically  significant is the one that captures the number of an NGO’s consultative 
relationships.  The greater the number of IGOs that view an NGO as an important source 
of information, the greater the likelihood that NGO would attend a higher proportion of 
WTO ministerial conferences that it was available to attend.  Insofar as this variable 
captures the groups that are aware of and concerned with the top-down structure of the 
international system, this result  offers support to that the general hypothesis for why 
NGOs would attend these conferences and, in particular, why they would attend these 
conferences repeatedly.
 The other two variables of interest, the number of IGO relations and the number 
of NGO relations, are insignificant.  Although this finding may  seem a bit surprising at 
first, it might also reflect an underlying difference within this group of NGOs that needs 
further exploration.  Large numbers of NGOs with consultative relationships also had 
general relations with IGOs and NGOs but the reverse is not necessarily true.  The 125 
NGOs with IGO relationships but no consultative relations or the 201 NGOs with NGO 
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relationships but no consultative relationships might indeed be responding to the bottom-
up pressures for mobilization, but only for one or two conferences or for conferences that 
are easier for them to attend.
 It is possible that  the insignificant findings on these variables reflect the nature of 
the sample included in this Tobit analysis.  The NGOs in this sample could behave 
differently from the rest of the population that has attended WTO ministerial conferences 
precisely because they are part of the group that can be found in the Yearbook of 
International Organizations.  The 399 NGOs in the regression are only 23 percent of total 
number of NGOs having attended at least one conference.  Consequently, the number of 
consultative relationships might  be the only  significant variable amongst this subset.  If, 
however, the same analysis were run on the entire population of NGOs, then the number 
of IGO relationships and NGO relationships might also prove significant to explaining 
which groups are more likely to attend the WTO ministerial conferences that they  are 
available to attend.
 Perhaps the most surprising result  of this analysis is one that is also, 
unfortunately, not statistically significant and that  is the negative coefficient for the 
number of NGO relationships variable.  Since this result is not meaningfully different 
from zero, the negative finding could reflect an issue with the data collected. 
Nevertheless, it would be interesting to explore whether or not a larger number of NGO 
relationships make a group less likely to attend regularly.  If that is the case, it might 
reflect a decision by  the NGO to rely  on its connections to ensure its interests are 
represented at  the meeting.  Conversely, groups with a smaller number of NGO 
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relationships may feel compelled to attend more regularly  if they hope to ensure their 
interests are represented. Such results point at the need for additional research on this 
population.
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NGOs, the WTO, and the Environment
 Simply  describing the population of nongovernmental organizations that have 
attended the six ministerial conferences of the World Trade Organization is a necessary 
first step for understanding who these groups are and why  they  do what they  do. 
However, it is only a first step.  Groups falling into at least seventy-five different subject 
areas attended these six ministerial conferences.18  Why?  For some NGOs, the answer to 
that question may seem obvious insofar as their interests are tied to instrumental goals 
having to do with trade itself.  However, other subjects such as the environment or peace 
and justice may seem less obviously tied to the business of the WTO.
 This chapter develops a general look at NGOs, the WTO, and the environment in 
an effort to explain why NGOs tied to this subject area have engaged the WTO.  The 
information that is presented comes from the NGOs and the WTO themselves, along with 
news accounts and other research that  has examined issues related to trade and the 
environment.  As with the last  chapter, the information provided is largely  descriptive in 
nature but it  sheds light on events that appear to have had an important affect on shaping 
the behavior of NGOs, both with regards to more conventional, domestic-level 
explanations as well as behavior that  seems to step outside of the traditional two-level 
18 Seventy-five is the total number of subject areas from the Yearbook of International Organizations.  
However, only 437 of the 1,738 groups in attendance at the six ministerial conferences could be found in 
the Yearbook, which means it is possible that this list of subject areas could grow as those 1,301 other 
NGOs are classified by their subject areas.
game.  The results of this analysis offer important insights into explaining the role of 
different types of NGOs within the international trade regime.
 Within this general framework the specific dispute examined involves the United 
States’ regulations on the importation of shrimp products.  On the surface the American 
regulations sought to protect endangered sea turtles but the dispute also involved 
questions surrounding whether or not such policies amounted to discriminatory  trade 
practices and protectionism by another name.  Within this context the shrimp-turtle 
dispute and the behavior of certain NGOs is instructive both with regards to the domestic 
or the international level.  As with the general population of NGOs, this information can 
shed further light on whether the framework for thinking about how states, non-state 
actors, and international organizations interact with one another needs to change as well 
as the validity of the two basic hypotheses presented in the second chapter.
The WTO and the Environment
 Since it was first established in 1995, the WTO has sought  to administer trade 
agreements in a manner consistent with the core principles of the international trade 
system that was setup  following World War II.  Among the key  principles it seeks to 
protect are nondiscriminatory  trade, and it is here that the WTO and the environmental 
regulations have come into conflict with one another.  Article XX of GATT 1947 contains 
the exception clause for these trade agreements, which allows states to sidestep trade 
rules if it is necessary to protect  human, animal, or plant life as well as for issues of 
health and the protection of exhaustible natural resources.  However, the GATT also 
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makes it clear that  these exceptions cannot be disguised protectionism, for example by 
discriminating between different sources of an import.
 During the formative decades of the GATT, no references were made to the 
environment at either general proceedings among the member states or during any of the 
trade disputes (WTO 1999).  Indeed, the GATT established a Group of Environmental 
Measures and International Trade in the early 1970s, but no request was made to convene 
that group until the beginning of the 1990s.  The only  environmental issue that came up 
much during the 1980s involved the transportation of hazardous materials and concerns 
by the importing countries that  they may not be fully  aware of the potential health and 
welfare issues associated with these dangerous materials.  The three environmentally-
related trade disputes during this time period included two between the United States and 
Canada about fisheries and one brought by Canada, Mexico, and the European 
Community against the United States’ exercise of superfund legislation (Kelemen 2001). 
According to the WTO, the absence of environmental issues during this time period 
reflected a belief that trade was not an environmental issue per se (WTO 1999).
 It was during the 1990s that environmental disputes came to the fore within the 
international trade system as a result of a number of contentious trade disputes.  First 
among these was the tuna-dolphin dispute brought by Mexico against the United States 
and the extra-territorial application of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) under 
the GATT system.  The MMPA required steps be taken to limit the incidental killing of 
marine mammals by commercial fisherman in both the United States as well as foreign 
states.  The GATT panel that reviewed this case ultimately  found the United States had 
82
erred in its use of an import ban because it  violated the national treatment provision, in 
particular the American policy  was said to violate protections against  discrimination 
based on process or production methods (WTO 1999).
 The final ruling by the GATT Council was never adopted in the tuna-dolphin case 
but that did not  necessarily  assuage the fears of environmental groups that this marked a 
watershed moment for policy-making at the nexus between trade and the environment 
(WTO 1999).  As the transition from the GATT to the WTO in 1995 shifted authority 
away from state autonomy, the concern for many  environmental groups was that their 
objectives and the trade-related provisions of multilateral environmental agreements 
would be challenged.  In particular, the fear was that states could now use trade 
agreements to challenge the environmental regulations of another state thereby sacrificing 
legitimate environmental concerns in the name of free trade (WTO 1999).
 It was against this backdrop  that the shrimp-turtle dispute came to embody the 
concerns of various NGOs about the role of the WTO in environmental regulations.  With 
the argument presented in chapter two in mind, the United States - Import  Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (WT/DS58/R) could be seen as a bellwether of 
where NGO participation with the WTO was headed because of the structure of the 
international trade regime and the threat posed by the WTO to the interests of a variety of 
different groups.  However, this case could just as easily represent an opportunity to be 
exploited by NGOs for the purpose of raising resources or exerting their influence within 
the overall group of NGOs.  To obtain a better sense of how this case fits in with the two 
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general hypotheses presented here it is necessary  to take a closer look at  the case, its 
domestic-level origins, the international-level dispute, and the response of NGOs.
Section 609: The Shrimp-Turtle Dispute
 The case of Section 609 of United States Public Law 101-162 seems to 
demonstrate that there are still important issues and considerations that must be taken into 
account if international relations theory  wants to gain even more leverage on the role of 
NGOs in international politics.  The law that  included Section 609 was first  passed by the 
U.S. Congress in 1989 and the regulations included in Section 609 called on the federal 
government to certify that shrimp imported into the United States be certified as caught 
using methods that protected sea turtles.  These regulations would go on to provide the 
basis for an important World Trade Organization case in the late 1990s that ultimately 
saw the United States revise the Section 609 regulations.
The Domestic-Level Origins
 If Section 609 were to be examined from the perspective of domestic-level 
theories, the issue seems to be an open and shut case of domestic interest groups, notably 
Atlantic and Gulf Coast shrimpers, using trade regulations to protect themselves from 
international competition.  The principle actors involved in this type of assessment would 
include the economic interest groups, the politicians responsible for passing the 
regulations, and the voters responsible for electing the politicians.  By all accounts, it is 
clear that the American shrimp  industry was on the defensive by  the late 1980s. 
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Shrimpers that trawled the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico faced increasing 
competition from domestic shrimp farms as well as cheap imports from all around the 
globe.19
 It was also during this time that federal regulations were starting to require all 
American shrimp boats utilize some form of turtle exclusion devise (TED) to help  protect 
threatened and endangered sea turtles.  These regulations were based on the Endangered 
Species Act of 1973 (ESA), and its ensuing amendments by the federal government of the 
United States, and provides one example of the trade-offs politicians face over 
regulations.  The stated purpose of the ESA was the direct protection of all threatened and 
endangered species through conservation efforts that would protect the environments in 
which these species live.  That same year the National Environmental Policy Act was 
passed, mandating that federal agencies consider the environmental impact  of any 
proposed action.  And the 1970s, more generally, saw the emergence of almost every 
environmental regulation agency in the United States (Viscusi et al. 2005).
 Within this context, the ESA that passed in 1973 faced little opposition, politically 
or otherwise, because many felt the legislation was a means for protecting endangered 
animals, like the bald eagle, without any perceived risks (Brown and Shogen 1998; Mann 
85
19 See, for example, Dawson (1986), Staff (1987), Toth (1988), and Cobb and Greene (1989) for 
contemporary news accounts of the challenges, real and perceived, faced by Gulf Coast shrimpers during 
the late 1980s.
and Plummer 1995).20  Ultimately, no members of the Senate voted against the bill and 
only four members of the House of Representatives voted against the bill that would go 
on to establish the ESA.  Politicians backed passage of the ESA because of the support it 
brought from both voters and environmental groups.  But the act also passed with little 
controversy  because it was written so broadly  that potential losers were not readily 
identifiable.21
 As time passed, however, tensions emerged between environmental groups, such 
as those seeking to protect endangered sea turtles, and economic-based interests, such as 
commercial shrimpers, who had not necessarily  been aware of the affect that the ESA 
would have on their interests.  In this case, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration's National Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA Fisheries Service) spent 
much of the decade following passage of the ESA studying endangered sea turtles and, by 
1982, had developed a turtle exclusion device that kept sea turtles out of shrimp nets a 
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20 The ESA attempted to expressly forbid economic considerations because “various species of fish, 
wildlife, and plants in the United States have been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth 
and development untempered by adequate concern and conservation” (16 U.S.C. 1531(a)(1) 1988).  In 
effect, the act claimed the value of an endangered species as being incalculable and the Supreme Court of 
the United States, in Tennessee Valley Authority vs. Hill (437 U.S. 153 1978), interpreted that to mean that 
it was impossible to offset the loss of something with an infinite value by something with a finite value.  It 
was partially in response to this ruling that politicians decided to pass the first broad set of amendments to 
the ESA in 1978 (Mann and Plummer 1995).  Among the changes made by these amendments was the 
creation of a special committee that could permit federal agencies to undertake an action that might 
knowingly harm a species otherwise protected by the act.
21 Few attempts had been made to create a truly comprehensive listing of the species that might be 
considered endangered or threatened prior to the passage of the ESA in 1973.  In 1964, a tentative list of 
endangered species included 64 animals but by 1973 the list had expanded to 187 animals (Mann and 
Plummer 1995).  It was only after the ESA passed that further studies were conducted regarding the total 
numbers of threatened and endangered as well as the actions deemed most threatening to these species.  
The endangered snail darter that was at the heart of Tennessee Valley Authority vs. Hill (437 U.S. 153 1978) 
was first discovered in 1973 and was declared an endangered species in 1975, but construction on the 
Tellico Dam, that would destroy the habitat of the snail darter, had originally started in 1967.  
Consequently, it was not until after the ESA was actually in place that politicians and the interest groups 
affected by the act understood the full magnitude of the trade-offs created by enforcing this act.
significant majority of the time.22  Initially, the installation of these devices was voluntary 
because they anticipated shrimpers would want the device since, in addition to keeping 
turtles out, the TED also cut down on the amount of other waste brought  on board shrimp 
trawlers by the nets (Yaninek 1995).  However, due to the reluctance of shrimpers to 
install the devices the U.S. Secretary of Commerce made them mandatory in 1987.23
 Faced with these pressures, the domestic-level literature would suggest that one 
solution for the domestic shrimps would be to offer financial support, in the form of 
campaign contributions, to politicians who would be likely to enact laws limiting the 
importation of shrimp.24  Politicians representing constituencies all along the Atlantic and 
Gulf Coasts did indeed introduce legislation that would have provided at least some relief 
to the shrimping industry.25  In many domestic-level approaches, the trade-offs that these 
politicians faced was between regulatory support for a special interest group on the one 
hand and voter welfare on the other hand.  Although any effort to protect the shrimping 
industry could have negatively affected voters, as consumers, the fact  was that this latter 
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22 NOAA Fisheries found that 48,000 sea turtles were caught in the shrimp nets of trawlers off the coasts of 
the United States, and an estimated 11,000 of these turtles died as a result (Yaninek 1995).
23 Turtle exclusion devices were initially only mandatory on all shrimp trawlers 25 feet in length or longer, 
while there was a 90 minute tow-time cap on trawlers shorter than 25 feet (52 Fed. Reg. 24244 1987).
24 The three most common arguments commercial shrimpers made against using exclusion devices were 
based on economic costs, the selective enforcement of the regulation, and numbers cited regarding sea 
turtle mortality (Yaninek 1995).
25 Politicians from Louisiana and Texas were particularly active in supporting the interests of the shrimpers 
because those two states combined for a significant majority of American shrimp production.  In March 
1987, Representatives Brooks and Sweeney of Texas proposed an amendment to a supplemental 
appropriations bill for 1987 that would have delayed implementation of the TED regulations by one year.  
Representative DeLay of Texas went on to argue that government studies identifying shrimping as the 
prime killer of endangered and threatened sea turtles failed to take into account the real world conditions 
faced by the shrimpers (Staff 1987).  And in October of 1987 the State of Louisiana filed suit against the 
United States Secretary of Commerce to challenge the validity of the TED regulations claiming that such 
regulations were arbitrary and capricious, constituted and abuse of discretion, and violated the shrimpers’ 
equal protection and due process rights (Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Verity 853 F.d. 322 5th Cir. 1988).
group did not organize in opposition to the measures even though that could have the 
affect of raising shrimp prices.
 On the surface Section 609 seems to offer support for the type of assessment that 
the domestic-level literature would bring to a case like this but, looking more closely at 
the processes involved, raises questions that fall outside of even the standard explanations 
offered by  this literature.  First, Section 609 itself made some pretense of being geared 
more toward the protection of sea turtles and not necessarily the protection of shrimpers. 
One way to explain this would be to expand the group of organizations involved to 
include the environmental groups advocating for the protection of threatened and 
endangered sea turtles as well as how the issue was framed by  competing groups.26 
Section 609 might therefore be seen as a way  to unite otherwise antagonistic interest 
groups behind a common policy (Grunbaum 2002).27  Politicians could therefore say they 
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26 Even though these politicians might have hoped to gain support from the shrimpers within their 
constituency, any changes to the ESA would have also alienated groups that supported the regulation.  For 
example, in 1990, Senator Johnston of Louisiana proposed the Trawlers Relief and Working Livelihood Act 
of 1990 for the express purpose of providing “relief to shrimp fishermen from economic hardships caused 
by the mandatory use of turtle excluder devices under the Endangered Species Act” (1990).  Among the key 
provisions of the proposed bill were tax credits for affected shrimpers and exemptions from all criminal 
penalties for violating the ESA.  While this bill was intended to help the interests of commercial shrimpers, 
it would have alienated environmental groups.  A “stop the presses” style announcement showed up in the 
Marine Turtle Newsletter highlighting Senator Johnson’s bill, and two additional bills in the House of 
Representatives, and implored its readers to “contact their Congresspersons and make in known that these 
bills should be rejected immediately.” (Quoted in Marine Turtle Newsletter 51:30-31, 1990)
27 The methods employed by both the shrimpers and the environmentalists to influence politicians and 
voters went well beyond simply campaign contributions.  Over the weekend of July 22 and 23, 1989, the 
shrimpers of Louisiana and Texas used their shrimp trawlers to blockade major ports along the Gulf Coast, 
including the Houston Ship Channel.  The action was ultimately a response to the requirements making 
TEDs mandatory earlier that year.  In addition to physically blocking traffic in and out of the ports, the 
shrimpers fired on vessels that tried to cross their blockade line and attempted to ram a Coast Guard patrol 
boat (Cobb and Greene 1989).  Over the near term, these tactics worked because Commerce Secretary 
Robert Mosbacher went on to suspend the TED requirements pending further study of the issue by the 
National Academy of Sciences (Wiessler and Moran 1989).  Conversely, environmental groups called on a 
general boycott of Louisiana and Texas shrimp (Wiessler 1989).  Besides getting the attention of shrimpers 
with the threat of a crippling boycott, the effort sought to portray the shrimpers as greedy businessmen that 
only cared about their catches to the broader public in the hopes that it would sway them against the 
shrimpers and in support of the TED regulations (Toth 1989).
supported protecting endangered species but they could also say that American shrimpers 
should not be the only ones paying the price for this protection.
 A second issue raised by the implementation of Section 609 were the guidelines 
drawn up  by both the Bush and Clinton Administrations.  If the issue was really only 
about protecting domestic shrimpers than one would expect Section 609 would be 
interpreted as expansively as possible to include all states that exported shrimp to the 
United States.  However, the initial guidelines only applied Section 609 to fourteen states 
of the western Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean.  In this manner, the regulation was 
initially only applied to a geographical area that included sea turtle populations similar to 
those found along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts of the United States.  This narrow 
interpretation also meant that the principal exporters of shrimp to the United States were 
not subjected to the regulation.28   By the time a case was brought against the United 
States at the WTO, the regulation had been expanded to include all importing nations but 
that expansion only came after environmental interest groups, and not the shrimpers, sued 
the federal government as a means of forcing Asian states to also do more to protect sea 
turtles.
The International-Level Dispute
 The shrimp-turtle dispute that ultimately made its way to the dispute settlement 
process of the WTO was the result of an April 1996 decision by the United States Court 
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28 Although the Bush and Clinton administrations officially explained the limited scope as being tied to sea 
turtle populations similar to those found in the coastal waters of the United States, news accounts 
highlighted that a broader enforcement of Section 609 could have led to trade disputes with important 
partners.  Additionally, there were concerns that such trade disputes would undermine ongoing negotiations 
for both the GATT and NAFTA (Kibel 1996).
of International Trade in Earth Island Institute v. Christopher.  Environmental groups 
within the United States criticized the initial decision to limit Section 609’s geographical 
application and decided to sue the government to force change.  This particular case was 
brought through the Court of International Trade because previous attempts by  Earth 
Island Institute and its Sea Turtle Restoration Project had been unsuccessful working 
through the federal district courts to compel the government to enforce the provisions of 
Section 609 and to apply the certification process to all countries.29   The Court for 
International Trade found that  Earth Island Institute had demonstrated its longstanding 
interest in sea turtle conservation.  It had also demonstrated that the government's failure 
to implement Section 609 to a wider geographical region presented an immediate and 
imminent danger to the group’s interest and that the relief sought by the NGO would 
provide an effective solution.  The court also found that Section 609's language requiring 
that the shrimp certification program be applied to all foreign countries was clear and 
unambiguous.30
 The argument presented by the United States, and its opposition to expanding 
Section 609, anticipated the potential for troubles between this regulation and American 
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29 Even before the shrimp-turtle dispute had been brought up at the WTO, this particular case had an 
important affect on determining which court within the United States had jurisdiction over such matters.  
Given the uncertainties of, and unfamiliarity with, the Court of International Trade, litigation was initiated 
by taking what was then seen as the path of least resistance. In 1993 Earth Island Institute first attempted to 
enforce Section 609 in federal district court.  However, in response to the government's contention that the 
Court of International Trade was the proper forum the federal district court rejected Earth Island Institute’s 
initial suit, as did the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In upholding the district court's dismissal, Judge 
Schroder of the Ninth Circuit observed that "embargoes are imposed for a broad range of purposes, 
including public health, safety, morality, foreign affairs interests, law enforcement, and ecology." (Quoted 
in Kibel 1996).
30 The government-defendants responded to Earth Island Institute's claim with two basic arguments. First, 
they argued that Earth Island Institute lacked standing to bring the suit, because the group did not have a 
legally sufficient interest in ensuring Section 609's full implementation.  Second, the government argued 
that the its own regulation limiting the geographic scope of Section 609 was a reasonable interpretation of 
the underlying legislation (Kibel 1996).
obligations under the GATT, as administered by the newly formed WTO.  Specifically, 
the United States focused on its international trade obligations and the fact that  Section 
609 could lead to conflicts under Articles III, XI and XX of the GATT (Kibel 1996).31 In 
considering this argument, the Court of International Trade admitted that the government 
could seek to reduce the likelihood of trade conflict.  However, the court also indicated 
that it was too early  to speculate on Section 609's potential conflict with international 
trade rules to warrant limiting the application of Section 609’s provisions to all countries 
(Kibel 1996).
 Despite losing Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, the United States government 
was correct in its anticipation of the complaints lodged by India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and 
Thailand and the creation of a dispute panel in February 1997.  However, the challenge 
presented by these East Asian and South Asian countries cannot be understood simply  by 
looking at regulations within the United States.  It is important to also consider the 
context associated with the more general debate about shrimp aquaculture, particularly  as 
an opportunity to help developing countries as a basis for rural development and a way  to 
generate foreign exchange (Béné 2005).
 Among the challenges were increasing concerns within East  Asia and South Asia 
about the overall affect of shrimp farming operations on the natural habitat.  Such 
challenges stood in marked contrast to earlier efforts in the 1970s and 1980s by various 
groups to study shrimp aquaculture as means for helping developing countries.  By the 
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31 Article III involved the national treatment principle while Article XI provides that, subject to certain 
limited exceptions, a GATT member state will not impose quantitative import restrictions or embargoes on 
the product of another GATT member state.  As noted previously, Article XX lists the exceptions which 
could justify a deviation from the basic free trade rules articulated in Articles III and XI.
late 1980s and 1990s, a number of international groups and the scientific community 
began to question such overall efforts because the rapid growth and expansion of 
unplanned shrimp farming activities appeared to be taking its toll on the local 
environment (Béné 2005).32   As a result of these challenges, the shrimp aquaculture 
industry in countries like India and Thailand found itself on the defensive both 
domestically and internationally.33  Even though the debate regarding shrimp aquaculture 
would ultimately return to one of education and management, the universal application of 
Section 609 came at the height of this challenge to the Asian shrimping industry (Béné 
2005).
 It is within this context the dispute that  arose between the United States and India, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand came under Articles XI and XX of the GATT.  The 
initial panel report that was circulated in May 1998 found that the United States had 
indeed violated the terms of both Articles XI and XX of the GATT (WTO 1998).  With 
regards to the Article XI, on quantitative restrictions, the United States appeared willing 
to concede that it could not justify  the quantitative restrictions that were part of Section 
609 since it  did not ultimately  respond to this element of the complaint.  The United 
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32 In a 1997 position statement on shrimp aquaculture the World Wide Fund for Nature argued: 
“[Commercial] shrimp farming has devastated fragile coastal ecosystems, causing mangrove destruction, 
coastal erosion, pollution of surface and ground-waters including salinization of vital coastal freshwater 
aquifers, and in some cases introduced exotic species.  The few cost-benefit analyses performed to date 
have indicated that the cost of natural resource depletion and environmental damage far outweighs the 
direct economic returns from the industry.”  (Quoted in Béné 2005, p. 589)
33 In 1996 in India, for example, the Supreme Court decreed the demolition of all shrimp farms that had 
been setup along coastlines, estuaries, and rivers as well as the conversion of other farmland, mangroves, 
and wetlands to new shrimp farms because of concerns about the environmental and social impact (Staff 
2002).  In 1997 the government of Honduras issued a moratorium on new shrimp farm construction and the 
government of Costa Rica went so far as to not renew old licenses in addition to its moratorium on new 
farms.  By 1998 the government in Thailand also stopped the construction of new inland farms because of 
these same concerns, a particularly important decision for environmental groups because Thailand had been 
the world’s largest producer of farmed shrimp at that time (Béné 2005; Vandergeest et al. 1999).
States did however challenge the argument that Section 609 represented arbitrary  and 
unjustifiable discrimination under Article XX, but both the original panel and the 
Appellate Body ultimately rejected these arguments.
 For many  environmental groups and other observers, the WTO’s ruling in the 
shrimp-turtle case further underscored the belief that environmental protection was being 
sacrificed in the name of free trade.  However, the WTO has insisted that its final ruling 
was misconstrued by these groups and its decision was far less antagonistic towards such 
issues.  In particular, the Appellate Body ruled that the United States, and other countries, 
had every right to enact regulations in order to protect endangered species.  However, it 
was the discriminatory way in which the United States offered assistance to countries 
trying to comply with Section 609 that was ultimately found a violation of the GATT. 
The United States had provided both financial and technical assistance to the countries to 
which it had initially applied these regulations to, countries of the western Atlantic Ocean 
and the Caribbean, but the United States did not provide the same level of assistance to 
the countries of East  Asia and South Asia.  Consequently, the provisions of Section 609 
were accepted by the WTO once the United States had remedied these problems (WTO 
2009).
The Nongovernmental Organizations
 Over the past four decades the battle between the interests of shrimpers and 
environmentalists has seen it  all -- from blockades of Houston and shots fired on the U.S. 
Coast Guard to shrimp boycotts and court actions, from plans to help  the poor of 
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developing states to the destruction of shrimp farms along national coasts and letters to 
prime ministers and presidents.  But what can all of these events really  say about the 
motivations that these groups had for behaving in such a manner?  How, for example, do 
these actions fit into the general theoretical argument and two basic hypotheses that were 
developed in the second chapter?  Answering such questions requires taking a closer look 
at the NGOs that have been involved throughout this process.
 As noted previously, the overall group of NGOs can be generally subdivided into 
three broad subgroups: economic-based NGOs, value-based NGOs, and epistemic 
groups. The differences between these subgroups correspond roughly to their different 
motivations and different endowments of political resources (Keck and Sikkink 1998). 
Economic-based NGOs are likely  to pursue instrumental goals that are themselves 
defined by  the position of the group with both the domestic and the international 
economy.  Value-based NGOs are likely to have goals defined by whatever common 
ideological, moral, or value-based belief brought the group  together.  Epistemic groups 
are motivated by  shared causal beliefs and are likely to pursue goals tied to their technical 
expertise and convincing others of their importance.
 The shrimp-turtle case has seen NGOs from all three of these groups become 
involved through the more conventional methods expected by the domestic-level 
literature in international relations theory  but also through alternative means that sidestep 
the basic two-level game.  Figure 4.1 shows the number of NGOs for three subject areas 
that were found in the Yearbook of International Organizations that attended each of the 
six ministerial conferences.  These three subject areas--agriculture and fisheries, 
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environment, and law--are all areas related to the three basic types of NGOs that  have 
attended the ministerial conferences, though these areas are not necessarily  mutually 
exclusive.  Looking at each of these groups in turn and how members of these groups 
behaved with regards to the overall shrimp-turtle dispute can provide additional detail 
about why these groups did or did not ultimately engage the WTO directly.
Figure 4.1: Agricultural and Fisheries, Environment, and Law NGOs by Conference
Economic-Based NGOs
 Economic interest groups form the first  sub-grouping and are groups that have 
economic or income-related interests in the regulations enacted by countries.  The basis 
for understanding why these groups form and why they will lobby other actors is tied to 
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the distributional affects the international economy has on their interests (Stolper and 
Samuelson 1941).  The primary political resources available to these groups are economic 
resources such as making financial contributions to politicians, which also makes them 
more likely  to get the attention of politicians (Keck and Sikkink 1998).  Here it is 
possible to use the agriculture and fisheries subject area from the Yearbook of 
International Organizations as a proxy for the groups whose fortunes would be tied to 
implementation of TED regulations or Section 609.  Figure 4.2 shows the number of 
agriculture and fisheries organizations from the regions involved in the shrimp-turtle 
dispute at each conference.
Figure 4.2: Agriculture and Fisheries NGOs By Region
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 The number of agriculture and fisheries NGOs from North America, East Asia and 
South Asia that can be found in the Yearbook and that were in attendance at WTO 
conferences is relatively small when compared to overall numbers from these subject 
areas.  Indeed, looking through the complete list of NGOs in attendance at conferences as 
well as those that have submitted position papers to the WTO does not reveal any of the 
agriculture or fisheries-related NGOs that played seemingly prominent  roles in the 
evolution of the overall context that brought about the Section 609 dispute.  What role 
then did these groups play with regards to these dispute during the 1980s and the 1990s?
 Among Gulf Coast shrimpers there was a sense of fear regarding their declining 
fortunes as they faced increasing competition from cheaper shrimp imports as well as an 
evolution in the nature of shrimp farming (Toth 1989). In the face of such direct 
challenges to their economic well being, it was easier for this concentrated group of 
shrimpers to come together and press for change at federal government level.  For 
example, in 1987, the Texas Shrimp Association argued for a proposed amendment to the 
ESA that was modeled after MMPA as way of establishing some form of sanctions 
against countries that did not protect endangered sea turtles (Grunbaum 2002).  In the 
meantime, groups such as Concerned Shrimpers of America led protests against the 
domestic TED regulations while other shrimpers blockaded ports along the American 
seaboard (Cobb and Greene 1989).
 However, once Section 609 went into affect and was subsequently challenged at 
the WTO, these groups largely disappeared from the overall story of the shrimp-turtle 
dispute.  When the results of the original panel report were being circulated in 1998, the 
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Southeastern Fisheries Association’s Hotlines newsletter simply observed that the United 
States had lost the case in a 60-word news item that indicated the United States 
government would likely appeal the ruling (Southeastern Fisheries Association 1998). 
The overall reaction of shrimpers along the Gulf Coast was one of resignation that the 
initial outcome would only reinforce the advantages that the foreign shrimpers had in 
producing and exporting shrimp (Wilson and Fletcher 1998).
 The absence of American-based shrimp-related groups from the list of NGOs that 
have directly engaged the WTO may ultimately  reflect the more traditional, domestic-
level explanations of international trade policy.  Even though members of these groups 
were concerned with the affects that the WTO’s ruling would have on them, they 
generally  seemed content to believe that the United States would not ultimately remove 
the import restrictions (Wilson and Fletcher 1998).  Similarly, these groups may  have 
been encouraged by the governments quick response to both appeal the initial ruling and 
to begin direct negotiations with the complainant countries.  What is more surprising, 
perhaps, is the absence of shrimp aquaculture-related groups, especially the international 
associations that have played some role in the general debate about shrimp aquaculture in 
the developing world.
 The World Aquaculture Society and its subsidiary, the Global Aquaculture 
Alliance, represent the interests of shrimp producers, processors, input suppliers, and 
wholesale buyers from around the world.  The Global Aquaculture Alliance was, itself, 
founded in 1997 to help study  the issues that had been raised by environmental NGOs 
about the harmful affects of shrimp farming on local environments throughout Asia.  It 
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was through these studies that the Global Aquaculture Alliance developed a series of 
codes of practice that have reflected an emphasis on the proper techniques for shrimp 
aquaculture as a means to promote both issues like development and environmental 
protection.  The arguments presented by these groups have largely  reframed the overall 
debate about  the consequences of shrimp aquaculture as it is viewed by organizations 
such as the World Bank and other development assistance programs (Béné 2005).
Value-Based NGOs
 Value-based NGOs form the second sub-grouping of NGOs and membership in 
these groups is not based on economic or income-related interests.  Instead, the members 
of these social movements share some set of ideological, moral, or value-based beliefs. 
Among the reasons that have been offered to explain why individuals associate with these 
movements are personal advantage, group solidarity, principled commitment to an issue, 
and the desire to be a part of a group  (Tarrow 1994).  However, much of the literature 
sidesteps explaining why individuals end up  with a particular set of shared ideological, 
moral, or value-based beliefs and simply notes that the members of these groups share 
some common interest (O'Brien et  al. 2000).  The primary  political resources available to 
these groups are the interpretation and strategic use of information as a means of 
mobilizing large numbers of people (Keck and Sikkink 1998).
 Here it is possible to look at the environment groups as a proxy for the value-
based organizations that were involved throughout the shrimp-turtle dispute.  Figure 4.3 
shows the number of environmental organizations from the regions involved in the 
shrimp-turtle dispute at each conference.  What is particularly noticeable among this 
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group is that the majority of North American-based NGOs in this subject area only 
attended the Seattle and Cancun conferences.  Granted, this example also demonstrates 
one of the shortcomings of just relying on the Yearbook of International Organizations 
for group classifications since Friends of the Earth USA attended every conference except 
for the first  one in Singapore, however, the group itself is not listed in the Yearbook. 
There are also a number of environment-oriented groups based in all three of these 
regions that are not necessarily reflected in those found in the Yearbook, such as 
additional members of the Friends of the Earth and the Greenpeace networks.
Figure 4.3: Environment NGOs By Region
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 Regardless of the exact  number of environmental groups that attended each 
conference, the regulatory goals of such value-based groups generally  defined by 
whatever common ideological, moral, or value-based beliefs that brought them together. 
Here, for example, the members of environmental groups tend to share some belief in the 
importance of making sure ecological systems are protected whether it  is endangered sea 
turtles or the destruction of coastal environments.  Such groups can be at a disadvantage 
when organizing because of the diffuse nature of the benefits and both the concentrated 
and diffuse nature of the costs associated with their preferred regulations.  Additionally, 
the benefits of such policies, like environmental protection, are long-term while the costs 
will be felt over the short-term.  As a result, environmental groups may emphasize how 
the issue is framed to help  overcome these difficulties.  For example, in specifying the 
language found in the ESA, environmentalists offered up language that precluded the use 
of any  economic standards that might allow others to avoid complying with the 
regulation (Mann and Plummer 1995).
 Whereas the economic-based NGOs involved in the various aspects that 
ultimately  led to shrimp-turtle dispute were largely absent  from contact with the WTO, 
the value-based organizations involvement is more varied.  Some organizations, like the 
Center for Environmental Education, the Center for Marine Conservation, and the 
Environmental Defense Fund, all played key roles in making TEDs mandatory  as part of 
domestic regulations.  However, these groups are completely absent from later stories on 
Section 609 and the shrimp-turtle dispute, including even NGO sign-on letters such as the 
“WTO - Shrink or Sink!” letter that can be found across the internet on websites for the 
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Council of Canadians, Public Citizen, and the Third World Network.  Other 
organizations, like the Earth Island Institute, Greenpeace, and the World Wide Fund for 
Nature, have bridged the gap between the domestic battles over TEDs and shrimp 
aquaculture with the international disputes surrounding the protection of endangered sea 
turtles.
 Earth Island Institute played a particularly important role in setting the shrimp-
turtle dispute in motion through its court challenge to the government’s implementation 
of Section 609.  More generally the organization played a leading role in educating 
consumers, national governments, and the fishing industry about the threats to sea turtles 
and the pressing need for TEDs at the domestic level (Kibel 1996).  Additionally, it 
founded the Sea Turtle Restoration Project to establish partnerships with conservation 
groups in Southeast Asia and Central America. This subgroup was particularly active in 
shrimp-turtle dispute once it  became an issue at the WTO.  It even argued that it should 
be included on the team appointed to help defend Section 609 at the WTO (Project 2009).
 The Sea Turtle Restoration Project  also serves as a prime example of the manner 
with which value-based groups employ  the strategic use of information to raise awareness 
of an issue as well as to frame it in terms favorable to the groups cause.  During June 
1997 the group placed ads in newspapers, such as the New York Times, in an attempt to 
alert the public to the threat they perceived for the WTO towards the ESA but also to 
issues of democracy and sovereignty.  At the same time, the Sea Turtle Restoration 
Project also questioned the selection of panelists adjudicating the dispute because of their 
ties to countries that were negatively affected by the Section 609 (Project 2009).  When 
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the initial ruling was announced, the Sea Turtle Restoration Project was just  one of many 
environmental NGOs that publicly  called on the Clinton Administration to appeal the 
WTO’s ruling.
 Among the other value-based groups that made similar calls were some, such as 
Greenpeace, that had played a role in the earlier domestic battle over TEDs as well as 
others, such as Friends of the Earth or the World Wide Fund for Nature, that had not 
played a large role previously.  Whereas the Sea Turtle Restoration Project and the Earth 
Island Institute that created it had demonstrated to the Court of International Trade that 
their membership cared immensely about sea turtle conservation, these other groups 
included NGOs that represented a host of different environmental issues.  As such it is 
not always easy to distinguish the degree to which their interests were specifically 
directed at the protection of sea turtles or involved a broader set of beliefs about the 
international trade system and its potential affect on environmental regulations.  For 
example, both Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature played a role in the 
debates about TEDs and about shrimp aquaculture.
Epistemic Groups
 Epistemic groups form the third sub-grouping of NGOs.  These groups are 
defined by their shared normative and principled beliefs, their shared causal beliefs, their 
shared notion of validity, and their shared set of practices and problems at which their 
expertise is directed (Haas 1992).  The primary political resources available to these 
groups are their knowledge and expertise (Keck and Sikkink 1998).  Members of 
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epistemic groups can find themselves in an important position for both framing the issues 
that are up  for debate and for setting the agenda in ways that will influence which policy 
outcomes are more likely to be accepted (Haas 1992).  For example, scientific experts 
both inside and outside the government played an important role in shaping both the 
debate and the outcome surrounding the regulations that would eventually require TEDs.
 Between 1973 and 1984, it was scientists at  NOAA Fisheries Service that 
conducted studies to help  determine what the biggest dangers were to endangered and 
threatened sea turtles.  These studies included a variety of methods such as observation 
aboard shrimp trawlers, volunteer beach patrols looking for stranded sea turtles, 
information from sea turtle tagging studies, and interviews with shrimpers (Yaninek 
1995).  Other experts, however, disagreed with the methods that generated these findings, 
particularly the extrapolations made using the observation data, and argued the 
government was not using the best possible scientific data when it relied on such 
information to determine the TED regulations.  Even after a federal circuit  court ruled in 
Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Verity (853 F.d 322 5th Cir 1988) that the extrapolation of the 
data used by the government had not been unreasonable, the battle over the TED 
regulations would continue on until 1990 when the National Academy of Sciences 
concluded that shrimp nets were still the largest human-related activity  that killed sea 
turtles.
 In addition to such studies conducted by governments themselves, a number of 
different NGOs that have played a role in the shrimp-turtle dispute also fit into the 
category of epistemic communities.  In many ways, the Sea Turtle Restoration Project 
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behaved like an epistemic community on the issue of endangered sea turtles because of 
its singular focus on research and advocacy in this area.  Similarly, legal groups like the 
Center for International Environmental Law and Earthjustice are examples of other 
groups with a particular expertise, in this case the law, that ultimately  helped shape the 
shrimp-turtle dispute.  Figure 4.4 shows the number of law organizations from the 
regions involved in the shrimp-turtle dispute at each conference that were found in the 
Yearbook of International Organizations.
Figure 4.4: Law NGOs By Region
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become the subject of a dispute at the WTO.  What ultimately  differentiates groups like 
these from the Sea Turtle Restoration Project is that the Center for International 
Environmental Law, for example, offered its legal expertise in the form of an amicus 
curia brief to help  explain how Section 609 and the GATT were not necessarily 
incompatible.  In its brief to the Appellate Body, the Center for International 
Environmental Law explicitly  argues the WTO must find a way to reconcile the desire 
and need for environmental regulations with the language of Article XX if the WTO 
hopes to develop a coherent set of jurisprudence (CIEL 1999).  This basic argument was 
echoed by those who viewed the Appellate Body’s final report as an attempt to placate 
interests that might have otherwise driven countries, especially  the United States, away 
from the WTO and towards other international bodies (Kelemen 2001).
 Regardless of whether this particular case posed a threat to the underlying 
authority of the WTO, the dispute is important from a legal perspective because groups 
like the Center for International Environmental Law ultimately won the right to submit 
unsolicited amicus curia briefs as part of its deliberations in a trade dispute (WTO 2006). 
Albeit the WTO, itself, is unaware of the exact number of such unsolicited amicus briefs 
as were submitted in this case or in subsequent cases because that material is considered 
confidential to the panels themselves.  The WTO does say  that in no case where such 
briefs were submitted was the final decision ultimately swayed by this unsolicited 
material.
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Evaluating the Hypotheses
 The overall pattern of observed behavior by NGOs that seemed to play key roles 
at various points offers mixed insights for the argument developed in the second chapter. 
If the creation of the WTO has truly altered the functioning of the international trade 
system the single most surprising result of this analysis may be that  relative lack of 
interest in the WTO that  was displayed by  the economic-based NGOs.  These are the 
groups who, after all, have an economic stake in the regulations that are being ruled on by 
the WTO.  Rather than vociferous calls to action, the newsletters of these groups seem to 
reflect a quiet resignation that the fortunes of shrimpers are never going to get better.  By 
contrast it is the value-based NGOs that mounted a spirited campaign on behalf of 
Section 609.  The Sea Turtle Restoration Project goes so far as to bombard the public and 
politicians alerts about  the potential threats the WTO poses to democracy and sovereignty 
while also digging up dirt on the members of the dispute panel.
 In spite of these surprises, it is not  clear that this pattern of behavior necessarily 
contradicts the argument presented in the second chapter.  If anything, this case only 
underscores the logic behind moving from a straight-line approach that treats states as 
gatekeepers to something approximating a triangular conception of the system.  The 
reasoning behind this triangular view is not to say that states are somehow unimportant in 
an increasingly globalized world but rather to acknowledge that NGOs have options for 
trying to achieve their desired policy outcomes.  From this perspective, the shrimpers of 
the United States may not have been as concerned with the WTO’s initial ruling because 
they  had a choice and ultimately decided that the state would still do something to protect 
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their interests.  Again, this was a sentiment found throughout shrimp industry  newsletters 
published at the time of the initial ruling by the WTO in the shrimp-turtle dispute.
 Environmental NGOs, on the other hand, may have been more deeply concerned 
with the potential implications of a WTO ruling because of the consequences it could 
have both on their domestic battles and on their increasing efforts to protect sea turtles 
worldwide.  The domestic consequences of the WTO’s decision could have split the 
coalition of shrimpers and environmentalists that supported Section 609 and led to a 
resumption of the battles that  had marked the fight over making TEDs mandatory. 
However, internationally  the consequences could have also hindered the ability of these 
groups to use Section 609 as an incentive to help move other states towards greater 
protection endangered sea turtles.  In this manner, the WTO could have threatened the 
ability  of environmental groups from around the world to boomerang their desired 
policies around otherwise recalcitrant governments by using the laws of the United States 
as an incentive.
 When it comes to the two general hypotheses regarding NGO behavior and this 
case, the results are equally  mixed.  Perhaps that strongest evidence that some NGOs 
were concerned with the top-down affects of the structure of the international trade 
system can be seen in the behavior of groups like the Center for International 
Environmental Law.  Here was a group  that was concerned with the manner in which the 
international trade system reconciled regulations that protected the environment with the 
need for open and non-discriminatory international trade.  The amicus brief filed by this 
group did not necessarily seek to undermine the WTO system so much as it wanted to 
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strengthen the overall framework in a manner that combined both.  In contrast, the Sea 
Turtle Restoration Project represents a group  that could be an NGO concerned with the 
top-down structure of the international system, but they could just as easily  be a group 
that recognizes the structure but is ultimately motivated by bottom-up pressures to 
establish themselves as the foremost authority on the sea turtle protection.
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Conclusion
 Although the basic principles at the core of the international trade system have 
changed little since the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the structure of the 
system itself has evolved in many important ways during this time.  Key among those 
changes is the overall growth in the number of nongovernmental organizations that have 
sought to engage the World Trade Organization.  From 108 at Singapore, the sight of the 
first official ministerial conference contact between NGOs and the WTO, to 739 at 
Seattle just three years later to, finally, 812 at Hong Kong, the last ministerial conference 
to date.  In spite of observations such as these very little is actually  known about this 
overall group of NGOs: who exactly are they and why do they do what they do?  
 Part of the reason so little is known about this group is that their actions 
seemingly fall outside the more standard explanations of how groups will interact with 
one another in international politics.  This dissertation has sought address this issue by 
reconsidering the general efficacy of using a theoretical framework that seems to ignore 
the possibility of such meaningful contact between groups like NGOs and international 
organizations.  In doing so, the alternative developed here reflects a “triangular” 
framework for considering the relationship  between three broad sets of actors: state 
actors, non-state actors, and international organizations.  This triangular shape does not 
preclude the existence of the more standard approach found within the literature that can 
be best described as a two-level game that traverses the state.  Indeed, the alternative 
framework presented here argues that the “straight-line” framework arises when the 
overall rules and opportunities of the system block off one side of the triangle, such as the 
side connecting NGOs directly to international organizations like the WTO.
 While developing this alternative framework, this dissertation devised two general 
hypotheses regarding why NGOs would choose to engage the WTO as plausibility  tests 
for this alternative.  The first hypothesis considered a top-down approach positing that 
NGOs engage the WTO because they are aware of the structure of the system and 
concerned with the affects it will have on the issues they care about.  The second, 
hypothesis reflected bottom-up considerations whereby NGOs may be seen as engaging 
the WTO but their real concern is with mobilizing resources and networking with other 
NGOs.  The expectation here being that clear indications these groups were mobilizing 
because of the opportunities generated by  the top-down structure of the system provides 
greater evidence for the need to rethink the framework used to examine interactions 
within the overall system itself.  In either case, the concern here lay not with whether 
these NGOs achieved the outcomes they desired but whether these explanations captured 
the reasoning behind why these groups would step  outside the conventional two-level 
game of international relations theory.
 The conclusions to be drawn from both a general look at the population and the 
examination of the shrimp-turtle dispute offer mixed results with regards to the 
plausibility of the alternative framework as well as these two general hypotheses.  If the 
transition to the WTO and the current system has truly  affected these opportunities, and 
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consequences, it seems surprising that more groups were not involved with the 
conferences on a more regular basis.  Instead, only nineteen groups have attended all six 
conferences to date while over half of all NGOs went to just one.  The NGOs that have 
more consultative ties to IGOs is a strong indicator of who has attended a greater 
proportion of the conferences they  were available to attend, however, this is still a rather 
small number of the overall total population.
 Similarly, the fact that economic-based NGOs did not do more once the shrimp-
turtle dispute had passed from the United States Court of International Trade to a dispute 
at the WTO seems startling given that this dispute had a direct economic affect on their 
interests.  The lack of evidence for even bottom-up mobilization efforts among shrimp 
producer associations stands in marked contrast  to their behavior during the earlier 
domestic dispute over the mandatory use of turtle excluder devices.  Rather the response 
of these organizations seems quite consistent with the expectations of more traditional, 
domestic-level explanations insofar as American shrimpers seemed to feel the United 
States government would protect their interests regardless of the WTO’s ruling.
 Conversely, some of the conclusions that can be drawn from both the description 
of the population and the shrimp-turtle dispute do seem to indicate that at least a subset of 
the overall NGO population is aware of the top-down opportunities in the system. 
Looking at the number of NGOs in attendance at WTO ministerial conferences it is 
unsurprising that the proportion of groups found in the Yearbook of International 
Organizations to those missing increases as the overall frequency  of attendance increases. 
Groups that  are found within the Yearbook already have some international orientation 
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about them and are, therefore, more likely to be aware of the structure of the system and 
have concerns about how the WTO will affect their interests.  These groups may also 
reflect a population of NGOs that  can be identified as having a country of origin but also 
where that country  only really represents the street address for a secretariat. 
Consequently, these groups may not have a single country they could rely on the way the 
American shrimpers had the United States government.
 Whether this subset primarily  includes groups motivated by top-down concerns or 
bottom-up concerns is not as readably distinguishable given the evidence here.  Looking 
that the Center for International Environmental Law, for example, it is possible to find 
information about the unsolicited amicus brief submitted as part  of the shrimp-turtle 
dispute as well as the NGOs attendance at conferences and even the submission of two 
position papers to the WTO.  The tone of these submissions generally reflect an interest 
in seeing the overall system of international law maintained and strengthened but also in 
a way that is not inherently combative towards environmental protections.  Although this 
information about the group’s contact with the WTO is out there, it is generally 
information that must be actively  sought out if one wishes to learn more.  As such this 
groups seems like a candidate for the type of NGO that is responding to the top-down 
opportunities created by the system itself.  These are the groups that missing from more 
traditional two-level explanations of international politics.
 Public Citizen is another organization that has attended four of the six ministerial 
conferences but its list  of other activities strike a tone that is as much about mobilizing 
individuals and other NGOs as it is about the WTO itself.  Prior to the Seattle conference 
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Public Citizen and its Global Trade Watch traveled throughout the United States trying to 
raise awareness of the WTO.  Public Citizen also publicizes the open letters it and 
hundreds of other NGOs have signed and sent to the United States Congress, for 
example.  Even the top item on the website for Global Trade Watch is a link to the official 
movie website for Battle in Seattle, a 2007 feature film starring such notable actors as 
Woody Harrelson and Charlize Theron.  Such activities do reflect an awareness of the 
top-down structure and a concern with the policies of the WTO.  However, it  seems just 
as plausible that Public Citizen’s continued presence at conference after Seattle is to 
ensure that it maintains a leading place among NGOs organizing to protest  the WTO. 
Although such motivations do not preclude the need to reevaluate the traditional two-
level explanations, they are not necessarily overwhelming support in favor of devising an 
alternative framework either.  Consequently  it would still be necessarily to learn more 
about all of the NGOs that attended each ministerial conference to ascertain this 
information.
What Are the Next Steps?
 Given the mixed results obtained by both looking at the population of NGOs at 
WTO conferences and the actions of select groups in the shrimp-turtle dispute, the next 
step would be to collect more information and the place to start would be the population 
ecology.  Although largely  descriptive, the population ecology and the database that was 
created for it represent an important first step in understanding more about the groups that 
have engaged the WTO.  However it would also be possible to press this population 
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ecology further in a number of ways that would further test both of the hypotheses here as 
well as allow for the development of new hypotheses regarding these NGOs and their 
behavior.
 First, with further research it should be possible to identify networks of 
organizations that are based on more than name association.  Utilizing these networks it 
would then be possible to identify  places where certain NGOs seem to be recruiting 
others to join them at a conference or, potentially, where one group  is sent  on behalf of a 
number of NGOs to any  given conference.  The Yearbook of International Organizations 
already provides some information on the linkages between different groups, especially 
those found in the Yearbook, and this could be used as a base for expanding to all of the 
groups present.  Knowing which attendees are members of such networks will further 
help  in evaluating the motivations for attending these conferences and whether they are 
driven by top-down concerns about the WTO or bottom-up concerns about the need to 
mobilize groups and resources.
 Second, expand the use of the Yearbook of International Organizations system to 
classify  all NGOs within the database by type and subject to provide an added layer of 
analysis across the entire population.  Given the Yearbook’s focus on “international” 
organizations, many national organizations are clearly missing from the analysis of type 
and subject presented here.  Whereas development might be the subject area for the 
largest number of international NGOs, a different subject may emerge as predominant 
once all the national farmers unions or national labor unions have been counted.  By 
including such detail for all 1,738 NGOs it would be possible to gauge whether or not the 
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attendance by any given group also reflected the issues on the agenda for a given 
conference.  Such information would prove beneficial in explaining whether a group’s 
attendance was driven by concerns about the WTO or by mobilization efforts and the 
need for resources.  This information would also allow for further hypotheses regarding 
the types of NGOs to be developed and tested.
 Although it may be possible to obtain a significant amount of this information by  
researching each NGO, it may also prove useful to actually survey these groups.  In 
designing a questionnaire it would be possible to ask the NGOs to also identify  the other 
groups they are affiliated with and the subject  areas they  deal with most often.  Even 
without a perfect response rate, it would be possible to use information as a check against 
the data collected from other sources as well as potentially provide valuable insight into 
whether or not an NGO’s interest in the WTO changed based on their first trip  to a 
conference.  This would help  get at the degree to which some groups change their 
motivation across time as, for example, they are recruited by another group to attend that 
first conference but decide to go back because of their interest in the WTO.  Or, perhaps 
some of the groups that only  attended one conference were genuinely  concerned with the 
top-down structure of the WTO but decided not to go back because the experience was 
not the one they  were looking for.  In addition to surveying the groups that attended these 
conferences it would also be important to survey the groups that did not  attend but seem 
like likely  candidates to get a sense of why these groups stayed away.  Perhaps they were 
unaware of the role of the WTO or perhaps they had found other ways to represent their 
interests that they believed were just as good.
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 In addition to fleshing out the population ecology for groups that attended the 
ministerial conferences, it would be possible to add to this an analysis of those groups 
which submitted position papers to the organization.  Content  analysis on these papers 
would offer insights into both the reasons these groups had for contacting the WTO but 
also what their interest in the organization is.  However, it would also be necessary to 
ascertain from the groups the circumstances surrounding these submissions and whether 
they  were submitted as part of the NGO’s conference attendance or separately.    Ideally, 
a similar level of analysis could also be brought to bear on the NGOs that attend WTO-
sponsored symposia as well as those groups that have submitted unsolicited amicus 
briefs.  Unfortunately, the confidential nature of these interactions will make it more 
difficult to ascertain the full size of the population involved.
 Looking at the shrimp-turtle case from an issue perspective offered up insights 
into locating various types of groups as well as whether or not they  tried to engage the 
WTO.  Additional research could take a similar look into a number of other issues, such 
as core labor standards or genetically  modified organisms, to see how the overall 
trajectory of these issues played out and what it can say about the decision by different 
NGOs to engage the WTO.  These two areas could prove especially insightful given the 
large number of agricultural groups and labor unions that show up in the database of 
NGOs that have attended WTO conferences.  But  it would also be useful to eventually 
add more of the responses by the states actors and the WTO itself to get a complete 
understanding of how all three of these groups of actors are interaction with and reacting 
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to one another.  Such insights will prove important because they  get  directly to the heart 
of our understanding about how actors behave in a globalized world.
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